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Abstract
I study identification, estimation and inference for spillover effects in experiments where
units outcomes may depend on the treatment assignments of other units within a group. I
show that the commonly-used linear-in-means regression identifies a weighted sum of spillover
effects with some negative weights, and characterize the estimand that is recovered by a simple
difference in means in the presence of spillovers. I establish nonparametric identification of
spillover effects, and propose nonparametric estimators that are consistent and asymptotically
normal under a precise relationship between the number of parameters of interest, the total
sample size and the treatment assignment mechanism. I then show that these results have
important implications for experimental design. These findings are illustrated using data
from a conditional cash transfer program in Colombia, and with simulations. (JEL C10,
C13, C14, C90)
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1 Introduction
Spillover effects, which occur when an agent’s actions or behaviors indirectly affect other
agents’ outcomes through peer effects, social interactions, externalities or other types of
interference, are pervasive in economics and social sciences. The widespread importance of
this phenomenon across fields and disciplines has led to a rich literature focusing on social
interactions (Manski, 1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Graham, 2008; Manski, 2013b), peer
effects (Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin, 2009; Epple and Romano, 2011; Sacerdote, 2014),
networks (Graham, 2015; de Paula, 2017), games with multiple equilibria (de Paula, 2013;
Kline and Tamer, 2019), design of experiments (Duflo and Saez, 2003; Hirano and Hahn,
2010; Baird, Bohren, McIntosh, and O¨zler, 2018), and causal inference (Tchetgen Tchetgen
and VanderWeele, 2012; Halloran and Hudgens, 2016).
A thorough account of spillover effects is crucial to assess the causal impact of policies and
programs (Abadie and Cattaneo, 2018; Athey and Imbens, 2017). However, the literature is
still evolving in this area, and most of the available methods either assume no spillovers or
allow for them in restrictive ways, without a precise definition of the parameters of interest
or the conditions required to recover them. This paper studies identification and estimation
of direct and spillover effects in randomized controlled trials, and offers three main contri-
butions. First, I precisely define causal spillover effects and provide conditions to identify
them. Section 2 sets up a causal potential-outcomes based framework that nests several
models commonly used to analyze spillovers. Under the assumption that interference can
occur within (but not between) the groups in which units are clustered, I define a rich set
of direct and spillover treatment effects which are all equally important to assess the effect
of a policy or treatment. I discuss an interpretable restriction, exchangeability, under which
average potential outcomes do not change when swapping the identities of the treated neigh-
bors. As shown in the paper, this restriction justifies the commonly employed assumption
that outcomes depend only on the number (or proportion) of treated neighbors. Nonpara-
metric identification of all the treatment effects of interest is analyzed in Section 3. This
framework highlights that the whole vector of direct and spillover effects can be identified
regardless of the treatment assignment mechanism, as long as the assignments occur with
non-zero probability.
Second, I analyze nonparametric estimation and inference for spillover effects. In the
presence of spillovers, estimation faces two main challenges: the number of treatment effects
to estimate can be large, and the probability of observing units under different treatment
assignments can be small. Section 4 provides general conditions that ensure uniform con-
sistency and asymptotic normality of the direct and spillover effects estimators with special
focus on the role of group size on estimation and inference. This approach formalizes the
requirement of “many small groups” that is commonly invoked in the literature, and spec-
ifies the role that the number of parameters and the assignment mechanism play on the
asymptotic properties of nonparametric estimators. More precisely, consistency and asymp-
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totic normality are shown under two main conditions that are formalized in the paper: (i)
the number of treatment effects should not be “too large” with respect to the sample size,
and (ii) the probability of each treatment assignment should not be “too small”. These two
requirements are directly linked to modeling assumptions on the potential outcomes, the
choice of the set of parameters of interest and the treatment assignment mechanism. As an
alternative approach to inference based on the normal approximation, the wild bootstrap is
shown to be consistent, and simulation evidence suggests that it can yield better performance
compared to the Gaussian approximation for moderately large groups.
The third main contribution is to show how these results can be used to guide the design of
experiments to estimate spillover effects. Specifically, the rate of convergence of the spillover
effects estimators and the rate of convergence of the distributional approximation are shown
to depend on the treatment assignment mechanism, which gives a principled criterion to rank
different procedures to assign the treatment. I demonstrate that a two-stage design that fixes
the number of treated units in each group can improve the performance of the estimators
in terms of inference, compared to simple random assignment, when groups are moderately
large.
The ideas and methods put forth in this paper are illustrated by reanalyzing a randomized
conditional cash transfer program studied by Barrera-Osorio, Bertrand, Linden, and Perez-
Calle (2011). I discuss the empirical performance of two regression-based specifications that
are widely used in empirical work: a regression of the outcome on a treatment indicator
(i.e. a difference in means) and a regression on a treatment indicator and the proportion of
treated neighbors (a reduced-form linear-in-means model). The results reveal the potential
pitfalls of failing to flexibly account for spillover effects in policy evaluation. Finally, Section
5 discusses the inclusion of covariates. Section 6 discusses several implications for empirical
work and points to upcoming and future work in the analysis of spillover effects.
1.1 Related literature
Despite the longstanding and widespread interest across different disciplines, identification
and estimation of spillover effects of programs and policies have proven a challenging prob-
lem. This subsection gives a brief description of some of the main approaches for analyzing
spillovers; Section A in the supplemental appendix offers a more detailed review of the liter-
ature.
One strand of the literature builds on the linear-in-means (LIM) model, which has been
the workhorse model for estimating peer effects in many areas of economics. Manski (1993)
pointed out several identification problems in the LIM model. Since Manski’s critique, the
literature has offered several alternatives to deal with endogeneity issues in these models.
The most credible ones rely on random assignment of peers (see Sacerdote, 2014, for a recent
survey) or random assignment of a treatment (Lalive and Cattaneo, 2009; Bobonis and Finan,
2009; Dieye, Djebbari, and Barrera-Osorio, 2014).
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Even in randomized contexts, identification in LIM models relies on the linearity assump-
tion imposed on the structure of spillover effects. The parametric assumptions in the LIM
models have been criticized for the unrealistic restrictions that they impose on the structure
of peer effects (see Sacerdote, 2014). While some empirical specifications have attempted
to relax parametric assumptions (Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005; Carrell, Fullerton, and West,
2009; Graham, 2008; Sacerdote, 2011, 2014), these models have only been analyzed from a
linear regression perspective; as such, the identified parameters can be interpreted as best
linear predictors, but their causal interpretation remains unclear, and Angrist (2014) has
criticized the usefulness of LIM models to recover causal effects. These limitations reflect the
lack of a causal framework to analyze spillover effects. This paper contributes to this strand
of the literature by providing a framework that does not rely on parametric assumptions
for identification and estimation. In Section 3.2, I also characterize the estimand from the
LIM model and provide conditions on potential outcomes to ensure that the LIM identifies
a meaningful causal parameter.
In a second strand of the literature, researchers have conducted and analyzed experi-
ments in which different units are assigned to treatment with varying probabilities, a design
that Moffit (2001) called partial population experiments. A popular design in this setting
is one in which groups of individuals (such as classrooms or households) are randomly di-
vided into two categories, and then the treatment is randomized in one of the categories,
leaving the other one as a pure control. This design was pioneered in an influential study
by Duflo and Saez (2003), and later implemented in different versions by Miguel and Kre-
mer (2004); Ichino and Schu¨ndeln (2012); Sinclair, McConnell, and Green (2012), Cre´pon,
Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora (2013), Beuermann, Cristia, Cueto, Malamud, and
Cruz-Aguayo (2015), Beshears, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Milkman (2015) and Gine´ and
Mansuri (2018), among others. Hirano and Hahn (2010) and Baird, Bohren, McIntosh, and
O¨zler (2018) study experimental design under two-stage random assignment.
A common feature in the analysis of partial population experiments is that spillover ef-
fects are defined as comparisons between groups facing different probabilities of treatment.
For example, Duflo and Saez (2003) define spillover effects as the average difference in out-
comes between untreated units in treated groups and untreated units in pure control groups.
This definition requires a specific experimental design. On the other hand, in the framework
described in Section 2, spillover effects are defined based exclusively on potential outcomes,
and have therefore a clear causal interpretation. These causal effects are shown to be iden-
tified under mild restrictions on the assignment mechanism without the need of any specific
experimental design. Finally, Section 4 shows that two-stage designs can, under some condi-
tions, significantly improve the performance of the nonparametric spillover effects estimators
I recommend.
A third strand of the literature focuses on identification in games with social interactions
or related strategic considerations (see e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001; de Paula, 2013; Blume,
Brock, Durlauf, and Jayaraman, 2015; Kline and Tamer, 2019). This game-theoretic approach
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is sometimes used to justify the LIM model under some assumptions, and more generally
highlights the key role of multiplicity of equilibria in this context. A related approach is
provided by Manski (2013b), who studies partial identification under different restrictions on
the structural model, the response functions and the structure of social interactions. The
relationship between reduced-form and structural response functions is discussed in Section
C of the supplemental appendix. This paper complements this important strand of the
literature by offering identification, estimation and inference results for well-defined causal
(reduced-form) treatment effects in the presence of spillovers.
Finally, a literature coming from statistics and epidemiology focuses on causal inference
and two-stage designs in a setting where potential outcomes are fixed and all randomness
is generated by the assignment mechanism (see Halloran and Hudgens, 2016, for a recent
review). Given this non-random potential outcomes setting, identification issues are largely
absent from this literature, and focus is placed mainly on p-values, variance and confidence
interval calculations (Rosenbaum, 2007; Hudgens and Halloran, 2008; Tchetgen Tchetgen
and VanderWeele, 2012; Liu and Hudgens, 2014; Basse and Feller, 2018). A growing related
literature studies interference in a setting that replaces a partial interference assumption
with more general network structures (Athey, Eckles, and Imbens, 2018; Choi, 2017). In this
paper, I take a super-population approach under repeated sampling which complements the
results available in this literature.
2 Setup
As a motivating example, consider the study by Barrera-Osorio, Bertrand, Linden, and
Perez-Calle (2011). The authors conduct a pilot experiment designed to evaluate the effect
of a conditional cash transfer program, Subsidios Condicionados a la Asistencia Escolar, in
Bogota´, Colombia. The program aimed at increasing student retention and reducing drop-
out and child labor. Eligible registrants ranging from grade 6-11 were randomly assigned to
treatment and control.1 The assignment was performed at the student level. In addition to
administrative and enrollment data, the authors collected baseline and follow-up data from
students in the largest 68 of the 251 schools. This survey contains attendance data and
was conducted in the household. As shown in Table 1, 1,594 households have more than
one registered children, and since the treatment was assigned at the child level, this gives
variation in the number of treated children per household, as can be seen in Table 2.
Given the distribution of treated siblings within households, there are several reasons to
expect spillover effects in this study. On the one hand, the cash transfer may alleviate a
financial constraint that was preventing the parents from sending their children to school on
a regular basis. The program could also help raise awareness on the importance of school
1The experiment had two different treatments that varied the timing of the payments, but, following the authors,
I pool the two treatment arms to increase the sample size. See Barrera-Osorio, Bertrand, Linden, and Perez-Calle
(2011) for details.
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Table 1: Distribution of household size
Frequency
1 5205
2 1410
3 168
4 15
5 1
Total 6799
Table 2: Treated per household
Frequency
0 2355
1 3782
2 607
3 52
4 3
Total 6799
attendance, encouraging parents to worry more about sending their children to school. In
both these cases, untreated children may indirectly benefit from the program when they
have a treated sibling. On the other hand, the program could create incentives for the
parents to reallocate resources towards their treated children and away from their untreated
siblings, decreasing school attendance for the latter. In all cases, ignoring spillover effects
can underestimate the costs and benefits of this policy. Moreover, these alternative scenarios
have drastically different implications on how to assign the program when scaling it up. In
the first two situations, treating one child per household can be a cost-effective way to assign
the treatment, whereas in the second case, treating all the children in a household can be
more beneficial.
With these ideas in mind, the goal of this paper is to analyze conditions under which
spillover effects can be precisely defined, identified and estimated.
2.1 Notation and parameters of interest
In light of the motivating example, consider a sample consisting of independent and identically
distributed groups indexed by g = 1, . . . , G, each with ng + 1 units, so that each unit in
group g has ng neighbors or peers. I assume group membership is observable. Units in each
group are assigned a binary treatment, and a unit’s potential outcomes, defined in the next
paragraph, can depend on the assignment of all other units in the same group. I refer to this
phenomenon as interference, and to the effect of a neighbor’s treatment assignment on unit
i’s potential outcome as spillover effect. Interference is assumed to occur between units in
the same group, but not between units in different groups, an assumption sometimes known
as partial interference (Sobel, 2006).
Individual treatment assignment of unit i in group g is denoted by Dig, taking val-
ues d ∈ {0, 1}, and the vector of treatment assignments in each group is given by Dg =
(D1g, . . . , Dng+1g). For each unit i, Djig is the treatment indicator corresponding to unit
i’s j-th neighbor, collected in the vector D(i)g = (D1ig, D2ig, . . . , Dngig) . This vector takes
values dg = (d1, d2, . . . , dng) ∈ Dg ⊆ {0, 1}ng . As will be discussed in more detail later,
this notation requires assigning identities to neighbors, although this requirement can be
dropped under additional assumptions. For a given realization of the treatment assignment
(d,dg) = (d, d1, d2, . . . , dng), the potential outcome for unit i in group g is denoted by the
5
random variable Yig(d,dg). Throughout the paper, I will assume that all the required mo-
ments of the potential outcomes are bounded. The observed outcome for unit i in group
g is the value of the potential outcome under the observed treatment realization, given by
Yig = Yig(Dig,D(i)g). Note that in the presence of interference, each unit has 2
ng+1 potential
outcomes, and this number reduces to the usual case with two potential outcomes when inter-
ference is ruled out. Hence, this setup relaxes the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption
(SUTVA), according to which the potential outcomes depend only on own treatment status,
Yig(d,dg) = Yig(d). I will assume perfect compliance, which means that all units receive the
treatment they are assigned to. I analyze the case of imperfect compliance in Vazquez-Bare
(2019). In what follows, 0g and 1g will denote ng-dimensional vectors of zeros and ones,
respectively. The observed potential outcome can be written as:
Yig =
∑
d∈{0,1}
∑
dg∈Dg
Yig(d,dg)1(Dig = d)1(D(i)g = dg).
To fix ideas, consider a household with three children, ng +1 = 3. In this household, each
kid has two siblings, with assignments d1 and d2, so dg = (d1, d2) and the potential outcome
is Yig(d, d1, d2). The number of possible treatment assignments (d, d1, d2) is 2
ng+1 = 8. For
example, Yig(1, 0, 0) − Yig(0, 0, 0) is the effect of the treatment when both of kid i’s siblings
are untreated, Yig(0, 1, 0) − Yig(0, 0, 0) is the spillover effect on unit i of treating kid i’s
first sibling, and so on. The average effect of assignment (d, d1, d2) compared to (d˜, d˜1, d˜2)
is thus given by E[Yig(d, d1, d2)] − E[Yig(d˜, d˜1, d˜2)]. For simplicity, throughout the paper I
will assume that potential outcomes within a group have the same distribution, so that in
particular E[Yig(d,dg)] does not depend on i or g.2
A salient feature of this model is that each unit has a specific identity in the sense that,
for example, with a group of size 3, E[Yig(d, 1, 0)−Yi(d, 0, 0)] 6= E[Yig(d, 0, 1)−Yig(d, 0, 0)] in
general, that is, the effect on unit i of giving treatment to neighbor 1 may differ in general
from the effect of giving treatment to neighbor 2. Hence, allowing for units to have specific
identities requires a natural labeling or ordering between units in each group, which can be
given for example by distance according to some specified metric. A natural example would
be geographical distance that orders neighbors from closest to farthest. Another example
would be the case where one can rank the relationships according to its strength, e.g. closest
friend, second-closest friend, etc.
Allowing for different neighbor identities leaves the structure of within-group spillovers
completely unrestricted. This level of generality, however, may easily introduce a dimension-
ality problem. The number of potential outcomes increases exponentially with group size,
and it can quickly become larger than the number of observations. More precisely, with
equally-sized groups, the number of observations is (ng + 1)G, whereas the number of po-
tential outcomes is 2ng+1, so there are at least as many potential outcomes as observations
2This assumption can be relaxed by allowing the averages to depend on i, and switching focus to the within-group
average (ng + 1)
−1∑ng+1
i=1 E[Yig(d,dg)].
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whenever 2ng+1 ≥ (ng + 1)G. As a simple illustration, with 200 groups, (G = 200), the
number of potential outcomes exceeds the total sample size as soon as ng + 1 ≥ 12. Even
when the condition (ng + 1)G > 2
ng+1 holds, the number of potential outcomes may be too
high for estimation results to be reliable. For example, with G = 200 and ng + 1 = 10, we
have 2000 observations to estimate 1024 average potential outcomes.
One way to reduce this dimensionality problem is to impose an “anonymity” assump-
tion under which the spillover effects do not depend on the specific identity of each treated
neighbor. Intuitively, this condition states that, given the number of treated neighbors for
a specific unit, the potential outcome does not change when swapping the treatment assign-
ment between neighbors, so that neighbors are exchangeable. In this case, the number of
possible potential outcome values in each group drops from from 2ng+1 to 2(ng + 1). To
formalize this idea, I assume the following condition.
Assumption 1 (Exchangeability) Let dg, d˜g ∈ Dg such that 1′gdg = 1′gd˜g. Then, for
each d = 0, 1,
E[Yig(d,dg)] = E[Yig(d, d˜g)].
Assumption 1 states that the average potential outcome is invariant to permutations of the
neighbor’s assignment vector dg. Exchangeability implies the following restriction on the
potential outcome.
Lemma 1 (Potential outcomes under exchangeability) For any dg ∈ Dg, let s =
1′gdg =
∑ng
j=1 dj. Under Assumption 1, for d = 0, 1, there is a function µ(d, ·) : {0, 1, . . . , ng}
→ R such that:
E[Yig(d,dg)] = µ(d, s).
Lemma 1 states that, for each unit i in group g, the average potential outcome only depends
on the neighbors’ assignment dg through s =
∑ng
j=1 dj . In this case, s = 0 indicates that
unit i in group g has no treated neighbors, whereas s = ng corresponds to the case where all
neighbors are treated, and so on. For any pair of vectors dg and d˜g such that 1
′
gdg = 1
′
gd˜g,
exchangeability restricts the average spillover effect to zero, that is,
E[Yig(d,dg)]− E[Yig(d, d˜g)] = 0.
This restriction is what reduces the number of parameters in the model.
Previous studies have considered this or similar versions of this assumption (see e.g.
Hudgens and Halloran, 2008; Manski, 2013b). In other cases, result in Lemma 1 is stated
as an assumption (see e.g. Baird, Bohren, McIntosh, and O¨zler, 2018; Ferracci, Jolivet,
and van den Berg, 2014). Lemma 1 explicitly states the restrictions that this condition
imposes on the potential outcomes. On the other hand, exchangeability is invoked, either
explicitly or implicitly, in nearly all empirical studies analyzing spillover effects. For example,
the requirement that potential outcomes depend only on the number (or proportion) of
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treated neighbors is a key assumption in linear-in-means models (Manski, 1993; Moffit, 2001;
Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin, 2009). Hence, the motivation for imposing Assumption 1
in this paper is understanding the extent to which this commonly invoked assumption affects
identification, estimation and inference.
The plausibility of the exchangeability assumption needs to be considered on a case-by-
case basis. Consider, for example, a program that assigns vaccines to students in classrooms
to prevent some contagious disease. It is possible that this program prevents the unvacci-
nated children from getting sick through herd immunity as long as the number of treated
children is large enough. In this case, it may be reasonable to assume that what matters is
not which students receive the vaccine, but how many of them, since all students share a
common closed space. In other cases, the exchangeability assumption may be less plausible.
For example, Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2013) study the diffusion of
information through social interactions in Indian villages, and show how adoption of a new
technology (microfinance loans) in a village depends on the degree of centrality of the indi-
viduals who are first informed about it. In such a case, it is clear than the effect of treating
a neighbor will vary depending on whether the neighbor is a “leader” or a “follower”.
I will maintain this assumption throughout this section to conserve space, but all the
ideas extend straightforwardly to the non-exchabngeable case. Section B of the supplemental
appendix provides a general treatment without exchangeability, discusses some alternatives to
relax this assumption and provides a formal test of exchangeability including some additional
empirical results. Moreover, Lemma 3 below analyzes the effect of incorrectly imposing
exchangeability.
I will define two sets of parameters of interest. First, the average direct effect of the
treatment given s treated neighbors is defined as:
τs = µ(1, s)− µ(0, s) (1)
so each τs represents the average effect of giving treatment to a unit, holding the number of
treated neighbors fixed at s. For a group of size ng + 1, there are ng + 1 of these parameters,
one for each possible value of s. Second, the average spillover effect of s treated siblings
given own treatment status d is:
θs(d) = µ(d, s)− µ(d, 0) (2)
so θs(d) captures the average effect of giving treatment to s neighbors, compared to having
no treated neighbors, for a unit under treatment status d. Importantly, these effects can
depend on ng, since in principle direct and spillover effects can be different in large versus
small groups. However, I will omit the ng from the arguments to avoid excessive notation (see
Section D on the supplemental appendix for further discussion). These two sets of parameters
do not exhaust all the possible comparisons between potential outcomes, but any other effect
of interest can be reconstructed as a linear combination of τs and θs(d). For instance, the
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marginal effect of an additional treated neighbor can be constructed as θs+1(d) − θs(d). In
the next section I provide conditions to achieve identification of these treatment effects when
the treatment is randomly assigned. Section 3.2 will link these parameters to the estimands
of the difference in means and the linear-in-means regression.
3 Identification
The key feature of random assignment is that it ensures that potential outcomes are unrelated
to treatment assignment. I formalize this condition as follows.
Assumption 2 (Random assignment) For all (d,dg) ∈ {0, 1} × Dg and for all i and g,
Yig(d,dg) ⊥ Dg.
This condition states that potential outcomes are statistically independent of the treatment
assignment vector, and rules out selection into treatment. Under SUTVA, this condition re-
duces to (Yig(0), Yig(1)) ⊥ Dig, which means for example that the average potential outcome
under no treatment is equal between treated and control units. In the presence of spillovers,
independence needs to be strengthened to ensure that the potential outcomes are indepen-
dent not only of own treatment assignment, but also of neighbors’ treatment assignments.
This requirement is guaranteed when the treatment is randomly assigned.
Let Sig :=
∑ng
j 6=iDjg be the observed number of treated neighbors for unit i in group
g. The following result shows identification of average direct and spillover effects under
exchangeability.
Lemma 2 (Identification) Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for d = 0, 1 and s = 0, 1, . . . , ng,
for any assignment such that P[Dig = d, Sig = s] > 0,
E[Yig|Dig = d, Sig = s] = µ(d, s).
Lemma 2 shows how, under random assignment of the treatment, all the average potential
outcomes can be nonparametrically identified by exploiting variation in all the possible con-
figurations of own and neighbors’ observed treatment assignments. It follows immediately
from Lemma 2 that:
τs = E[Yig|Dig = 1, Sig = s]− E[Yig|Dig = 0, Sig = s]
and
θs(d) = E[Yig|Dig = d, Sig = s]− E[Yig|Dig = d, Sig = 0].
The main condition to achieve identification under random assignment is that the treat-
ment assignment mechanism puts non-zero probability on each (d, s), that is, P[Dig = d, Sig =
s] > 0. In the absence of spillovers, this condition is trivially satisfied, since there are only
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two treatment assignments, treated and control, that occur with non-zero probability as
long as P[Dig = 1] ∈ (0, 1). In the presence of spillovers, this requirement becomes non-
trivial because the number of possible treatment assignments is potentially large, and some
assignment mechanisms could place zero probability in some of them. For example, con-
sider a cluster randomized trial in which groups, instead of units, are assigned to treatment
with probability 1/2, so that in each group either everybody is treated or nobody is. This
assignment mechanism implies that P[Dig = 1, Sig = ng] = P[Dig = 0, Sig = 0] = 1/2
and P[Dig = d, Sig = s] = 0 for all assignments (d, s) different from (1, ng) and (0, 0).
Hence, the only treatment effect that can be identified under this assignment mechanism is
µ(1, ng)− µ(0, 0), that is, the effect of being treated with all treated neighbors compared to
being untreated with no treated neighbors. Assigning the treatment at the individual level
is therefore a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to identify all the direct and spillover
effects.
On the other hand, Lemma 2 also shows that complex assignment mechanisms like two-
stage designs assignments like the ones discussed by Moffit (2001), Duflo and Saez (2003),
Hirano and Hahn (2010) and Baird, Bohren, McIntosh, and O¨zler (2018), among others, are
not required for identification purposes (although they can improve estimation and inference,
as discussed in Section 4).
A natural question that stems from this discussion is what parameters can be recovered
when exchangeability is incorrectly assumed. The following lemma addresses this issue.
Lemma 3 (Identification with misspecified exchangeability) Under Assumption 2, for
any assignment such that P[Dig = d, Sig = s] > 0,
E[Yig|Dig = d, Sig = s] =
∑
1′gdg=s
E[Yig(d,dg)]
P[Dig = d|D(i)g = dg]P[D(i)g = dg]
P[Dig = d|Sig = s]P[Sig = s] .
This result shows that when incorrectly assuming exchangeability, exploiting variation in
the number of treated neighbors recovers a weighted average of all the spillover effects for a
fixed value of s using the assignment probabilities. In particular, when individual treatment
assignments are iid within a group, this expression reduces to:
E[Yig|Dig = d, Sig = s] =
(
ng
s
)−1 ∑
1′gdg=s
E[Yig(d,dg)]
and thus E[Yig|Dig = d, Sig = s] is a simple average of the average potential outcomes
E[Yig(d,dg)] taken over all the possible assignments with s treated neighbors.
Hence, even when exchangeability does not hold, it can still be used as a device to reduce
the number of parameters to be estimated, at the expense of losing the heterogeneity in
spillover effects generated by the different neighbor identities.
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3.1 Pooled estimands
Pooling spillover effects can provide a useful summary measure of spillovers, and can be a
feasible alternative when the total number of parameters is large and hence each θs(d) may
be imprecisely estimated, an issue that will be analyzed in detail in Section 4.
Lemma 2 implies that, for any known (or estimable) vector of weights ω = {ωs(d)}(d,s),
the pooled spillover effect:
θp(ω) =
ng∑
s=1
ωs(0)θs(0) +
ng∑
s=1
ωs(1)θs(1)
is identified. I will discuss two ways to pool spillover effects.
The first way consists on directly grouping units facing different number of treated peers
together. For example, one possibility would be to compare control units with no treated
peers to control units with one or more treated peers, effectively computing:
∆ = E[Yig|Dig = 0, Sig > 0]− E[Yig|Dig = 0, Sig = 0]
From the results in previous section, under the conditions of Lemma 2,
∆ =
ng∑
s=1
θs(0)P[Sig = s|Dig = 0, Sig > 0].
Thus, ∆ is a weighted average of spillover effects on the controls, with weights given by the
conditional probabilities of having each possible number of treated peers. Since the weights
depend only on the experimental design, they are known to the researcher when conducting
a randomized trial. A natural generalization of this idea is to divide the values of Sig into
categories, such as Sig ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Sig = {k + 1, . . . , ng} and so on.
The second way to pool spillover effects is based on the experimental design. More
specifically, a popular design when analyzing spillover effects is the partial population design
(Moffit, 2001; Baird, Bohren, McIntosh, and O¨zler, 2018). Consider the experiment by Duflo
and Saez (2003), in which groups are randomly divided into treated and control using a binary
indicator Tg. Then, within the groups with Tg = 1, treatment Dig is randomly assigned at
the individual level. In these type of experiments, spillover effects are often estimated as the
average difference between control units in treated groups and control units in pure control
groups,
∆PP = E[Yig|Dig = 0, Tg = 1]− E[Yig|Tg = 0]. (3)
For recent examples of this or similar strategies, see Ichino and Schu¨ndeln (2012); Sinclair,
McConnell, and Green (2012), Beuermann, Cristia, Cueto, Malamud, and Cruz-Aguayo
(2015), Beshears, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Milkman (2015) and Gine´ and Mansuri
(2018), among others. The following result shows the causal parameter that is recovered
by ∆pp.
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Lemma 4 (Identification in partial population experiments) If Yig(d,dg) ⊥ (Dg, Tg),
under Assumption 1,
∆PP =
ng∑
s=1
θs(0)P[Sig = s|Dig = 0, Tg = 1].
Hence, ∆PP recovers a weighted average of all the spillover effects on the controls, where the
weights are given by the probability of each possible number of treated neighbors in treated
groups. The generalization of this result to experiments with more than two categories, as
in Cre´pon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora (2013), is straightforward.
3.2 Empirical illustration
This section employs the data from the experiment described in Section 2 to illustrate the
above results. I analyze direct and spillover effects restricting the sample to households with
three registered siblings, which gives a total of 168 households and 504 observations. The
outcome of interest will be school attendance.
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Table 3: Estimation results
Diff. Means Linear-in-Means Full Pooled
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Dig 0.006 0.016 0.007 0.016 0.102** 0.042 0.164** 0.066 0.165** 0.065
D¯
(i)
g 0.027 0.034
D¯
(i)
g (1−Dig) 0.169** 0.068
D¯
(i)
g Dig -0.064 0.039
1(Sig = 1)(1−Dig) 0.146** 0.066
1(Sig = 2)(1−Dig) 0.14** 0.056
1(Sig = 1)Dig -0.041* 0.023
1(Sig = 2)Dig -0.051** 0.025
1(Sig > 0)(1−Dig) 0.144** 0.06
1(Sig > 0)Dig -0.045** 0.02
Constant 0.822*** 0.013 0.811*** 0.024 0.756*** 0.037 0.706*** 0.057 0.705*** 0.057
Observations 504 504 504 504 504
Notes: S.e. clustered at the household level. Regressions include school FE. ***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05,*p < 0.1.
13
The results are obtained by estimating the following regression:
E[Yig|Dig, Sig] = α+ τ0Dig +
ng∑
s=1
θs(0)1(Sig = s)(1−Dig) +
ng∑
s=1
θs(1)1(Sig = s)Dig (4)
where α = µ(0, 0). Because it is equivalent to estimating averages at each cell separately,
Equation (4) does not impose any parametric assumptions. The total number of parameters
in this regression is 2(ng + 1) = 6, so the number of coefficients equals the number of average
potential outcomes to estimate.
The estimates from Equation (4) are shown in the right panel of Table 3. These estimates
suggest a positive direct effect of the treatment of 16.4 percentage points, significant at the
5 percent level, with almost equally large spillover effects on the untreated units. More
precisely, the estimated effect on an untreated kid of having one treated sibling is 14.6
percentage points, while the effect of having two treated siblings is 14 percentage points.
The fact that we cannot reject the hypothesis that θ1(0) = θ2(0) suggests some form of
crowding-out: given that one sibling is treated, treating one more sibling does not affect
attendance. These facts could be consistent with the idea that, for example, the conditional
cash transfer alleviates some financial constraint that was preventing the parents from sending
their children to school regularly, or with the program increasing awareness on the importance
of school attendance, since in these cases the effect occurs as soon as at least one kid in the
household is treated, and does not amplify with more treated kids.
On the other hand, spillover effects on treated children are much smaller in magnitude
and negative. Notice that the fact that these estimates are negative does not mean that the
program hurts treated children, but that treating more siblings reduces the benefits of the
program. For example, the effect of being treated with two treated siblings, compared to
nobody treated, can be written as µ(1, 2) − µ(0, 0) = µ(1, 0) − µ(0, 0) + µ(1, 2) − µ(1, 0) =
τ0 + θ2(1), so it can be estimated by τˆ0 + θˆ2(1) ≈ 0.113. Thus, a treated kid with two treated
siblings increases her attendance in 11 percentage points starting from a baseline in which
nobody in the household is treated.
In all, the estimates suggest large and positive direct and spillover effects on the untreated,
with some evidence of crowding-out between treated siblings. In addition to these results,
Table 6 in the supplemental appendix shows the estimates when relaxing exchangeability
and defining sibling identities based on difference in ages. The results and the formal test of
equality of coefficients clearly show that exchangeability cannot be rejected in this case.
3.3 Difference in means
The above results can be used to understand how some specifications commonly used in
empirical studies perform in this type of contexts. Suppose initially that the experiment was
analyzed using a difference in means between treated and controls, ignoring the presence of
spillovers. The left panel of Table 3 shows the difference in means, which is the estimator
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that is used when spillovers are ignored, usually calculated as the OLS estimator for βD in
the model:
Yig = αD + βDDig + uig. (5)
The results show that the difference in means is close to zero and not significant. Hence, by
ignoring the presence of spillover effects, a researcher estimating the effect of the program in
this way would conclude that the treatment has no effect. This finding captures the intu-
ition that in the presence of spillovers, the “contamination” of the control group pushes the
difference between treated and controls towards zero. More formally, we have the following
result:
Lemma 5 (Difference in means) Under the conditions for Lemma 2, the coefficient βD
from Equation (5) can be written as:
βD = τ0 +
ng∑
s=1
θs(1)P[Sig = s|Dig = 1]−
ng∑
s=1
θs(0)P[Sig = s|Dig = 0]
Hence, the (population) difference in means equals the direct effect without treated siblings
plus the difference in weighted averages of spillover effects under treatment and under con-
trol. A common treatment assignment mechanism is simple random assignment. Under this
mechanism, the treatment is assigned independently and with the same probability to each
unit in the sample. In this case, the above expression reduces to:
βD = τ0 +
ng∑
s=1
(θs(1)− θs(0))P[Sig = s]
The effect of the presence of spillovers in the difference in means, captured by the term∑ng
s=1(θs(1)− θs(0))P[Sig = s], is undetermined in general, and it could be positive, negative
or zero depending on the relative magnitudes of the spillover effects under treatment and
control. If all the spillover effects are equal under treatment and control, θs(0) = θs(1)
for all s, then the difference in means βD equals the direct effect of the treatment without
treated siblings, τ0. On the other hand, if all the spillovers under treatment are zero and
the spillovers under control have the same sign as the direct effects, the spillover effects will
drive the difference in means towards zero, which captures the idea of “contamination” of
the control group.
From Table 3, the estimated spillover effects in this case are much larger under control
that under treatment, and have different signs, so θˆs(1)− θˆs(0) < 0. Therefore, the spillover
effects push the difference in means towards zero in this case.
3.4 Linear-in-means models
Equation (5) may give an incomplete assessment of the effect of a program because it com-
pletely ignores the presence of spillovers. When trying to explicitly estimate spillover effects,
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a common strategy is to estimate a reduced-form linear-in-means model (see e.g. Lalive and
Cattaneo, 2009; Bobonis and Finan, 2009; Dieye, Djebbari, and Barrera-Osorio, 2014), which
is given by:
Yig = α` + β`Dig + γ`D¯
(i)
g + ηig, D¯
(i)
g =
1
ng
∑
j 6=i
Djg (6)
that is, a regression of the outcome on a treatment indicator and the proportion of treated
neighbors. In this specification, γ` is usually seen as a measure of spillover effects, since it
captures the average change in outcomes in response to a change in the proportion of treated
neighbors.
The estimates from Equation (6) are given in the first column of the middle panel in Table
3. The estimates suggest slightly negative and not significant direct and spillover effects,
substantially different from results using Equation (4). To better understand this point,
Equation (4) suggests the assumptions required for a LIM model to be correctly specified. In
particular, we can see that if (i) the spillover effects are equal under treatment and control,
θs(0) = θs(1) = θs for all s and (ii) the spillover effects are linear in s, that is, θs = κs for
some constant κ, then Equation (4) reduces to:
E[Yig|Dig, Sig = s] = α+ τ0Dig + θngD¯(i)g
so that γ` = θng and thus the coefficient on the proportion of treated neighbors recovers
the spillover effect of treating all neighbors (and the remaining effects can be obtained using
linearity of the spillovers). However, the spillover effect estimates in Table 3 suggest that
the LIM assumptions do not seem to hold in this case. More in general, the following result
holds.
Lemma 6 (LIM regression) Under the conditions for Lemma 2 and simple random as-
signment, the coefficient γ` from Equation (6) can be written as:
γ` = ng
ng∑
s=1
[θs(0)(1− p) + θs(1)p]Cov(Sig,1(Sig = s))V[Sig]
= ng
ng∑
s=1
[θs(0)(1− p) + θs(1)p]
(
s− E[Sig]
V[Sig]
)
P[Sig = s]
where p = P[Dig = 1].
This results shows that γ` captures a rather complicated linear combination of all the spillover
effects under treatment and control. More precisely, γ` first averages the spillover effects under
treatment and control, θs(0)(1−p)+θs(1)p, and then combines all these terms. Importantly,
the “weights” assigned to each of the terms θs(0)(1 − p) + θs(1)p are not bounded between
zero and one, and they sum to zero. In fact, these weights are negative for all values s below
the mean of Sig, and positive for all the values above. In this case, we have that γˆ` will assign
negative weight to the first term and positive weight to the second one.
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A straightforward way to make Equation (6) more flexible is to include an interaction
between Dig and D¯
(i)
g to allow for the spillover effects to be different under treatment and
control:
Yig = α` + β`Dig + γ
0
` D¯
(i)
g (1−Dig) + γ1` D¯(i)g Dig + ξig (7)
The third column of the middle panel in Table 3 shows that the estimates for the spillover
effects for treated and control are actually quite close to the estimates from the full model,
which could suggest that this strategy can be a good approximation to the true spillover
effects. However, in this case we have the following result.
Lemma 7 (LIM with interactions) Under the conditions for Lemma 2 and simple ran-
dom assignment, for d = 0, 1 the coefficients γd` can be written as:
γd` = ng
ng∑
s=1
θs(d)
(
s− E[Sig]
V[Sig]
)
P[Sig = s]
Thus, the only difference is that each γd` combines the spillover effects under a fixed treatment
status d, instead of averaging θs(0) and θs(1). As before, this expression shows that the
coefficients γd` are not weighted averages of the spillover effects θs(d). More precisely, they
assign negative weights to the parameters θs(d) with s below E[Sig] and positive weights
when s is above E[Sig]. Hence, these coefficients will not in general lie between the true
spillover effects.
3.5 Pooled effects
Finally, I illustrate how to estimate pooled effects by averaging over the possible number of
treated siblings (2 and 3 in this case). For this, I estimate the following regression:
Yig = αp + βpDig + γ
0
p1(Sig > 0)(1−Dig) + γ1p1(Sig > 0)Dig + νig
where as shown in Section 3.1,
γdp =
2∑
s=1
θs(d)P[Sig = s|Dig = d, Sig > 0].
From Table 3 we can see that the estimated pooled spillover effects are 0.144 for controls
and −0.045 for treated, which as expected lie between the effects found with the saturated
regression. These results illustrate how this type of pooling can provide a useful summary of
spillover effects, which may be a feasible alternative when the total number of spillover effects
is too large to estimate them separately. I address this issue in detail in the next section.
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4 Estimation and inference
The previous section illustrates how, under random assignment of the treatment, all the
parameters of interest can be recovered using a fully-saturated regression with the number
of coefficients equal to the number of average potential outcomes to estimate.3 The main
challenge of this strategy arises when groups are large. A large number of units per group
requires estimating a large number of means in each of the cells defined by the assignments
(d, s). When groups have many units (as in households with many siblings or classrooms
with a large number of students), the probability of observing some assignments can be close
to zero and the number of observations in each cell can be too small to estimate the average
potential outcomes.
For example, suppose the treatment is assigned as an independent coin flip with probabil-
ity p = 1/2. Under this assignment we would expect most groups to have about half its units
treated, so when groups have, say, 10 units, 5 of them would be treated on average. The
probability of observing groups with zero or all treated units, on the other hand, will be close
to zero, and thus the average potential outcomes corresponding to these “tail assignments”
will be very hard to estimate.
So far, the analysis has been done taking group size as fixed. When group size is fixed,
small cells are a finite sample problem that disappears asymptotically. To account for this
phenomenon asymptotically, in this section I will generalize this setting to allow group size
to grow with the sample size. The goal is to answer the question of how large can groups be,
relative to the total sample size, to allow for valid estimation and inference. More formally, I
will provide conditions for consistency and asymptotic normality in a setting in which group
size is allowed to grow with the sample size. The key issue will be to ensure that the number
of observations in all cells grows to infinity as the sample size increases. It is important to
clarify that this setup is not intended to model a population in which groups are effectively
infinitely large, but as a statistical device to approximate the distribution of estimators in a
finite sample when the number of parameters can be “moderately” large, in a sense that will
be made more precise in this section. The case with fixed group size will be shown to be a
particular case in this setting.
In addition, I will relax the assumption of exchangeability to allow for a general treatment
of potential outcomes. This generalization will allow me to analyze the role of different
potential outcome restrictions and different choices of parameters of interest in the asymptotic
properties of the proposed estimators.
I will start by defining two concepts that will play a crucial role in estimation and in-
ference. First, let An be the set of effective treatment assignments, with cardinality |An|.
This set contains all the treatment assignments that are of interest for the researcher in
a particular study. For example, if the researcher suspects the absence of spillovers and
3As stated in Assumption 3, I will assume in this section that groups are equally sized. The case with unequally-
sized groups is briefly discussed in Section D of supplemental appendix.
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only cares about comparisons between treated and controls, this set can be defined as
An = {0, 1}. When the goal is to estimate spillover effects under exchangeability, as
in Equation (4), An = {(d, s) : d = 0, 1, s = 0, 1, . . . , ng} and |An| = 2(ng + 1). On
the other hand, when aiming at estimating all the possible direct and spillover effects,
An = {(d,dg) : d = 0, 1,dg ∈ {0, 1}ng} and |An| = 2ng+1. Thus, the set An indicates which
(and how many) conditional means have to be estimated. The more information one wants
to extract from the sample to study spillover effects, the more complex this set becomes, and
the larger the number of parameters to estimate. The observed effective assignment for unit
i in group g is denoted by Aig, and µ(a) = E[Yig|Aig = a] for a ∈ An.
Second, each treatment assignment mechanism determines a distribution pi(·) over An
where pi(a) = P[Aig = a] for a ∈ An. For example, in an experiment without spillovers in
which the treatment is assigned independently as a coin flip, pi(1) = P[Dig = 1] = p and
pi(0) = 1 − p. Under the same assignment, by allowing for spillovers with exchangeability,
pi(d, s) = P[Dig = d, Sig = s] =
(
ng
s
)
ps+d(1 − p)ng+1−s−d. In the latter case, as group size
increases, |An| → ∞ and pi(a)→ 0 for all a. Finally, define:
pin = min
a∈An
pi(a)
which is the probability of the least likely treatment assignment. This probability, together
with the total sample size, will determine the number of observations in the smallest assign-
ment cell, that is, the number of observations available to estimate the “hardest” average
potential outcome.
Let Ag = (A1g, . . . ,Ang+1,g), A = (A1, . . . ,AG), and Yg = (Y1g, Y2g, . . . Yng+1,g)
′. I will
assume the following sampling scheme.
Assumption 3 (Sampling and design)
(i) For g = 1, . . . , G, (Y′g,A′g) is a random sample.
(ii) Within each group g, the observed outcomes Yig are independent and identically dis-
tributed across units, conditional on Ag.
(iii) ng = n for all g = 1, . . . , G.
(iv) |An| = O(G(n+ 1)pin), as G→∞ and n→∞.
Part (i) in Assumption 3 states that the researcher has access to a sample of G independent
groups. Part (ii) requires that the outcomes have the same distribution within a group,
and are independent conditional on the vector of effective treatment assignments. This
assumption rules out the presence of within-group correlations or group-level random effects,
but can be relaxed to arbitrary covariance structures when the group size is fixed using
standard cluster variance estimators, as discussed later. Part (iii) imposes that all groups
have equal size. When groups may have different sizes (for example, households with 3, 4 or
5 siblings), the analysis can be performed separately for each group size. Section D of the
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supplemental appendix further discusses the case of unequally-sized groups. Finally, part (iv)
requires that the total number of parameters do not grow faster than the effective sample
size, that is, the expected sample size in the smallest cell.
Given a sample of G groups with n + 1 units each, let 1ig(a) = 1(Aig = a), Ng(a) =∑n+1
i=1 1ig(a) and N(a) =
∑G
g=1Ng(a), so that Ng(a) is the total number of observations
receiving effective assignment a in group g and N(a) is the total number of observations
receiving effective assignment a in the sample. The estimator for µ(a) is defined as:
µˆ(a) =

∑G
g=1
∑n+1
i=1 Yig1ig(a)
N(a) if N(a) > 0
@ if N(a) = 0
Thus, the estimator for µ(a) is simply the sample average of the outcome for observations
receiving assignment a, whenever there is at least one observation receiving this assignment.
The following assumption imposes some regularity conditions that are required for up-
coming theorems. Let σ2(a) = V[Yig|Aig = a].
Assumption 4 (Moments)
(i) inf
n
min
a∈An
σ2(a) ≥ σ2 > 0, (ii) sup
n
max
a∈An
E[Y 6ig|Aig = a] ≤ τ¯6 <∞
Then we have the following result.
Theorem 1 (Effective sample size) Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, and consider an
assignment mechanism pi(·) such that pi(a) > 0 for all a ∈ An. If
log |An|
Gpi2n
→ 0 (8)
then for any c ∈ R
P
[
min
a∈An
N(a) > c
]
→ 1.
Theorem 1 says that, under condition (8), the number of observations in the smallest cell
will go to infinity, which implies that all the estimators are well defined asymptotically.
Hence, condition (8) formalizes the meaning of “large sample” in this context, and states
that the number of groups has to be large relative to the total number of parameters and
the probability of the least likely assignment. This expression can be interpreted as an
invertibility condition for the design matrix of a linear regression model, in the specific case
in which the regressors are mutually exclusive indicator variables.This requirement can be
seen as a low-level condition that justifies the assumption of invertibility of the design matrix
(see e.g. Assumption 2 in Cattaneo, Jansson, and Newey, 2018).
Next, let
σˆ2(a) =
∑G
g=1
∑n+1
i=1 (Yig − µˆ(a))21ig(a)
N(a)
1(N(a) > 0)
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be the standard error estimators. Then we have the following result.
Theorem 2 (Consistency and asymptotic normality) Under the conditions of Theo-
rem 1,
max
a∈An
|µˆ(a)− µ(a)| = OP
(√
log |An|
G(n+ 1)pin
)
,
max
a∈An
∣∣σˆ2(a)− σ2(a)∣∣ = OP
(√
log |An|
G(n+ 1)pin
)
,
(9)
and
max
a∈An
sup
x∈R
∣∣∣∣∣P
[
µˆ(a)− µ(a)√
V[µˆ(a)|A] ≤ x
]
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ = O
(
1√
G(n+ 1)pin
)
(10)
where Φ(x) is the cdf of a standard Gaussian random variable.
Equation (9) shows that both the average potential outcome and standard error estimators
converge in probability to their true values, uniformly over treatment assignments, at the
rate
√
log |An|/(G(n+ 1)pin). The denominator in this rate can be seen as the effective
sample size in the smallest cell, whereas the numerator is a penalty for having an increasing
number of parameters. Equation (10) bounds the difference between the distributions of the
standardized potential outcomes estimators and the standard normal distribution, uniformly
over the treatment assignments. Under condition (8), G(n+1)pin → 0, which gives asymptotic
normality. Furthermore, this bound also reveals the rate at which the distribution of the
standardized estimator approaches the standard normal, namely,
√
G(n+ 1)pin, where G(n+
1)pin is the minimum expected number of observations across cells, mina∈An E[N(a)].
Importantly, both the rate of convergence and the rate of the distributional approximation
depend on the assignment mechanism through pin, and this finding has key implications for
the design of experiments to estimate spillovers, as discussed in section 4.2.
Remark 1 (inference with many small groups). The case of fixed group size cor-
responds to a setting in which the number of units per group is small compared to the total
sample size, so that the effect of group size disappears asymptotically. In this context, condi-
tion (8) holds automatically as long as the number of groups goes to infinity. Consistency and
asymptotic normality of the estimators can be achieved under the usual regularity conditions
as G → ∞, and the variance estimator can easily account for both heteroskedasticity and
intragroup correlation using standard techniques. The particular case with homoskedasticity
and a random-effects structure was analyzed by Baird, Bohren, McIntosh, and O¨zler (2018).

Remark 2 (inference for pooled parameters). Estimation of pooled estimands
as described in Section 3.1 is easily seen to satisfy the conditions for Theorems 1 and 2.
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Consider for example the parameter ∆pp in Equation 3. In this case, the set of effective
treatment assignments can be defined as An = {(t, d) = (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1)} corresponding
to the average outcomes for units in pure control groups (Tg = 0), control units in treated
groups (Tg = 1, Dig = 0) and treated units in treated groups (Tg = 1, Dig = 1), respectively.
In this case, |An| = 3 and hence the number of parameters and the probabilities of each
assignment do not change with group size. Hence, condition (8) holds when G → ∞, and
∆ from Equation 3 can be estimated at rate
√
G(n+ 1). In fact, because the number of
parameters is fixed, these pooled estimands can be consistently estimated even in cases in
which G is fixed and n → ∞, at least when observations are assumed to be iid. This
asymptotic approximation may be more appropriate for studies with a small number of large
groups, such as cases in which the groups are villages or large geographical units (see e.g.
Ichino and Schu¨ndeln, 2012; Gine´ and Mansuri, 2018; Cre´pon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot,
and Zamora, 2013). Hence, pooled estimands provide a feasible alternative that is easier to
estimate when the number of parameters is large, at the expense of ignoring spillover effect
heterogeneity. 
4.1 Bootstrap approximation
An alternative approach to perform inference in this setting is the bootstrap. Since the
challenge for inference is that cells can have too few observations for the Gaussian distribution
to provide a good approximation, the wild bootstrap (Wu, 1986; Mammen, 1993; Kline and
Santos, 2012) can offer a more accurate approximation when groups are relatively large. This
type of bootstrap can be performed by defining weights wig ∈ {−1, 1} with probability 1/2
independently of the sample. The bootstrap estimator for µ(a) is given by:
µˆ∗(a) =
∑
g
∑
i Y
∗
ig1ig(a)
N(a)
whenever the denominator is non-zero, where
Y ∗ig1ig(a) = (Y¯ (a) + (Yig − Y¯ (a))wig)1ig(a) = (Y¯ (a) + εˆigwig)1ig(a)
In what follows, P∗[·] denotes a probability calculated over the distribution of wig, conditional
on the sample, and E∗[·] and V∗[·] the expectation and variance calculated over P∗[·]. The
validity of the wild bootstrap is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Wild bootstrap) Under the conditions of Theorem 2,
max
a∈An
sup
x∈R
∣∣∣∣∣P∗
[
µˆ∗(a)− µˆ(a)√
V∗[µˆ∗(a)]
≤ x
]
− P
[
µˆ(a)− µ(a)√
V[µˆ(a)|A] ≤ x
]∣∣∣∣∣→P 0.
This theorem shows that the wild bootstrap can be used to approximate the distribution of
the estimator as an alternative to the standard normal, which may not be accurate when cells
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have few observations. The performance of the wild bootstrap will be illustrated in Section
4.3 using simulation data.
4.2 Implications for experimental design
Theorem 2 shows that the quality of the standard normal to approximate the distribution of
the standardized statistic depends on the treatment assignment mechanism through pin. The
intuition behind this result is that our ability to estimate each µ(a) depends on the number
of observations facing assignment a, and this number depends on pi(a). When the goal is to
estimate all the µ(a) simultaneously, the binding factor will be the number of observations in
the smallest cell, controlled by pin. When an assignment sets a value of pin that is very close
to zero, the Gaussian distribution may provide a poor approximation to the distribution of
the estimators.
When designing an experiment to estimate spillover effects, the researcher can choose
distribution of treatment assignments pi(·). Theorem 2 provides a way to rank different
assignment mechanisms based on their rate of the approximation, which gives a principled
way to choose between different assignment mechanisms.
The results below consider two treatment assignment mechanisms. The first one, simple
random assignment (SR), consists on assigning the treatment independently at the individual
level with probability P[Dig = 1] = p. This mechanism is used in the experiment analyzed in
the empirical illustration. The second mechanism will be two-stage randomization. Although
there are several ways to implement a two-stage design, I will focus on the case in which each
group is assigned a fixed number of treated units between 0 and n+ 1 with equal probability.
For example, if groups have size 3, then this mechanism assigns each group to receive 0, 1,
2 or 3 treated units with probability 1/4. This mechanism will be referred to as two-stage
randomization with fixed margins (2SR-FM). This mechanism is analyzed in Baird, Bohren,
McIntosh, and O¨zler (2018), although its benefits in terms of asymptotic inference have not
been previously studied.
When required, it will be assumed that exchangeability holds on the first 6 moments of
the potential outcomes, that is, for p = 1, . . . , 6, E[Y pig(d,dg)] = E[Y
p
ig(d, d˜g)] for any pair of
vectors such that 1′gdg = 1′gd˜g. In particular, V[Yig(d,dg)] = σ2(d, s) where s = 1′gdg.
Corollary 1 (SR) Under simple random assignment, condition (8) holds whenever:
n+ 1
logG
→ 0. (11)
Corollary 2 (2SR-FM) Under a 2SR-FM mechanism, condition (8) holds whenever:
log(n+ 1)
logG
→ 0. (12)
In qualitative terms, both results imply that estimation and inference for spillover effects
require group size to be small relative to the total number of groups. Thus, these results
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formalize the requirement of “many small groups” that is commonly invoked, for example,
when estimating LIM models (see e.g. Davezies, D’Haultfoeuille, and Fouge`re, 2009; Kline
and Tamer, 2019).
Corollary 1 shows that when the treatment is assigned using a simple random assignment,
group size has to be small relative to logG. Given the concavity of the log function, this is a
strong requirement; for instance, with a sample of G = 300 groups, having n = 5 neighbors
already gives n + 1 > logG. Hence, groups have to be very small relative to the sample
size for inference to be asymptotically valid. The intuition behind this result is that under a
SR, the probability of the tail assignments (0, 0) and (1, n) decreases exponentially fast with
group size.
On the other hand, Corollary 2 shows that a 2SR-FM mechanism reduces the requirement
to log(n+ 1)/ logG ≈ 0, so now the log of group size has to be small compared to the log of
the number of groups. This condition is much more easily satisfied, which in practical terms
implies that a 2SR-FM mechanism can handle larger groups compared to SR. The intuition
behind this result is that, by fixing the number of treated units in each group, a 2SR-FM
design has better control on how small the probabilities of each assignment can be, hence
facilitating the estimation of the tail assignments.
4.3 Simulations
This section illustrates the above findings in a simulation setting. More precisely, I will study
the performance of the spillover effects estimators under simple random assignment and 2SR-
FM, as described in the previous section. The outcome will be binary and generated by the
following DGP:
P[Yig(d,dg) = 1] = µ(d, s) = 0.75 + 0.13× d+ 0.12× (1− d)1(s > 0)
which corresponds to the case with µ(0, 0) = 0.75, τ = 0.13, θs(0) = 0.12 for all s and
θs(1) = 0 for all s. That is, the spillover effects on an untreated unit is equal to 0.12
whenever at least one neighbor is treated, and zero for treated units.
The simulations consider two assignment mechanisms: SR with P[Dig = 1] = 0.5 and
2SR-FM in which groups are equally likely to be assigned to have any number from 0 to
n + 1 treated units. From Corollary 2, this assignment mechanism weakens the conditions
for consistency and asymptotic normality from (n+ 1)/ logG→ 0 to log(n+ 1)/ logG→ 0.
The parameter of interest will be θn(0) = E[Yig(0, n)]− E[Yig(0, 0)], which is the average
spillover effect for an untreated units with all neighbors treated. In this simulation, θn(0) =
0.12 This parameters can be seen as a “worst-case scenario” given that the probability of the
assignment (Dig, Sig) = (0, n) is one of the smallest (in fact, the smallest under 2SR-FM).
The estimator will be the difference in cell means:
θˆn(0) =
∑
g
∑
i Yig1ig(0, n)
N(0, n)
−
∑
g
∑
i Yig1ig(0, 0)
N(0, 0)
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Figure 1: Coverage rate of the 95% confidence interval.
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(a) θˆn(0), G = 300
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(b) θˆn(0), G = 600
Notes: the dashed lines show the coverage rate of the 95% confidence interval for θn(0) based on the normal
approximation under simple random assignment (red line) and two-stage randomization (blue line) for a sample
with 300 (left) and 600 (right) groups. The solid lines show the coverage rates for the confidence interval constructed
using wild bootstrap.
whenever N(0, n) > 1 and N(0, 0) > 1, so that both the estimator and its standard error can
be calculated. When at least one of the cells has one or zero observations, the estimator is
undefined.
Table 4 presents the results for a sample with 300 groups, for four group sizes, n + 1 =
3, 6, 9, 12. The upper panel shows the results under SR while the lower panel corresponds to
the 2SR-FM assignment. In each panel, the first row gives the value of the condition to achieve
consistency and asymptotic normality; intuitively, the closer this value is to zero, the better
the approximation based on the Gaussian distribution should be. The second and third rows
show the bias and the variance of θˆn(0), calculated over the values of the simulated estimates
conditional on the estimate being well defined (i.e. when the cells have enough observations
to calculate the estimator). The third and fourth rows show the coverage rate of a 95%
confidence interval based on the Gaussian approximation and a wild bootstrap confidence
interval. Finally, the sixth row, labeled “proportion of empty cells”, gives the proportion of
the simulations in which the estimator or its standard error could not be calculated due to
insufficient number of observations.
The simulations reveal that under both assignment mechanisms, the estimators perform
well for n = 2 and n = 5, with biases close to zero and coverage rate close to 95%. In both
cases the coverage rate decreases as group size increases reaching 88% under SR and 90%
for 2SR-FM. For n = 11, the variance under SR is much larger than the one under 2SR-FM.
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Table 4: Simulation results, G = 300
n = 2 n = 5 n = 8 n = 11
Simple randomization
(n + 1)/ log(G) 0.5260 1.0519 1.5779 2.1039
Bias −0.0006 0.0007 0.0041 −0.0118
Variance 0.0027 0.0128 0.0433 0.0654
95% CI coverage - normal 0.9505 0.9348 0.9110 0.8792
95% CI coverage - bootstrap 0.9508 0.9403 0.9452 0.9517
Prop. empty cells 0.0000 0.0087 0.5730 0.9851
Two-stage randomization
log(n + 1)/ log(G) 0.1926 0.3141 0.3852 0.4357
Bias −0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 −0.0003
Variance 0.0024 0.0034 0.0046 0.0058
95% CI coverage - normal 0.9422 0.9334 0.9198 0.9042
95% CI coverage - bootstrap 0.9433 0.9331 0.9115 0.8919
Prop. empty cells 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: simulation results for G = 300 groups. The second and third rows in each panel show the bias and variance
of θˆn(0). The fourth and fifth rows show the coverage rate of a normal-based and wild-bootstrap-based 95%
confidence intervals, respectively. The sixth row shows the proportion of simulations in which θˆn(0) is undefined
due to the small number of observations in the corresponding cell. Results from 10,000 simulations with 2,000
bootstrap repetitions.
These sharp differences in precision are due to the fact that, under simple randomization,
when n = 11 the probability of observing observations in the cells (0, 0) and (1, n) is very
close to zero; as shown in the fourth row of the upper panel, the estimator is undefined in
almost 99% of the simulations, and, when it is defined, it relies on a very small number
of observations. In fact, the expected number of observations in these cells is about 1.6,
not enough to calculate a standard error. On the other hand, the variance under 2SR-FM
is much more stable across group sizes, and the estimator can be defined in 100% of the
cases. The difference in coverage rates under the two assignment mechanisms becomes more
evident when G = 600, as shown in Figure 1. On the other hand, the wild bootstrap-
based confidence interval maintains coverage close to 95% for all group sizes under simple
randomization, whereas both the normal-based and the bootstrap-based confidence intervals
perform similarly under 2SR. These results are also illustrated in Figure 1.
Table 5 shows the same results for a sample with 600 groups. As expected, the estimator
and confidence intervals show better performance compare to the case with G = 300.
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Table 5: Simulation results, G = 600
n = 2 n = 5 n = 8 n = 11
Simple randomization
(n + 1)/ log(G) 0.4690 0.9379 1.4069 1.8759
Bias 0.0001 −0.0004 0.0028 0.0022
Variance 0.0013 0.0059 0.0270 0.0613
95% CI coverage - normal 0.9482 0.9438 0.9107 0.8521
95% CI coverage - bootstrap 0.9473 0.9465 0.9310 0.9281
Prop. empty cells 0.0000 0.0000 0.3112 0.9263
Two-stage randomization
log(n + 1)/ log(G) 0.1717 0.2801 0.3435 0.3885
Bias 0.0005 0.0002 −0.0004 0.0005
Variance 0.0012 0.0017 0.0023 0.0028
95% CI coverage - normal 0.9483 0.9419 0.9360 0.9244
95% CI coverage - bootstrap 0.9479 0.9423 0.9373 0.9232
Prop. empty cells 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: simulation results for G = 600 groups. The second and third rows in each panel show the bias and variance
of θˆn(0). The fourth and fifth rows show the coverage rate of a normal-based and wild-bootstrap-based 95%
confidence intervals, respectively. The sixth row shows the proportion of simulations in which θˆn(0) is undefined
due to the small number of observations in the corresponding cell. Results from 10,000 simulations with 2,000
bootstrap repetitions.
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5 Including covariates
There are several reasons why one may want to include covariates when estimating direct and
spillover effects. First, pre-treatment characteristics may help reduce the variability of the
estimators and decrease small-sample bias, which is standard practice when analyzing ran-
domly assigned programs. Covariates can also help get valid inference when the assignment
mechanisms stratifies on baseline covariates (Bugni, Canay, and Shaikh, 2018). This can be
done by simply augmenting Equation (4) with a vector of covariates γ ′xig which can vary
at the unit or at the group level. The covariates can also be interacted with the treatment
assignment indicators to explore effect heterogeneity across observable characteristics (for
example, by separately estimating effects for males and females.
Second, exogenous covariates can be used to relax the mean-independence assumption in
observational studies. More precisely, if Xg is a matrix of covariates, a conditional mean-
independence assumption would be
E[Yig(d,dg)|Xg,Dg] = E[Yig(d,dg)|Xg]
which is a version of the standard unconfoundeness condition. The vector of covariates can
include both individual-level and group-level characteristics.
Third, the exchangeability assumption can be relaxed by assuming it holds after condi-
tioning on covariates, so that for any pair of treatment assignments dg and d˜g with the same
number of ones,
E[Yig(d,dg)|Xg] = E[Yig(d, d˜g)|Xg]
For example, exchangeability can be assumed to hold for all siblings with the same age,
gender or going to the same school.
All the identification results in the paper can be adapted to hold after conditioning on
covariates. In terms of implementation, when the covariates are discrete the parameters of
interest can be estimated at each possible value of the matrix Xg, although this strategy can
worsen the dimensionality problem. Alternatively, covariates can be included in a regression
framework after imposing parametric assumptions, for example, assuming the covariates enter
linearly.
6 Discussion
This paper develops a potential-outcome-based nonparametric framework to analyze spillover
effects that nests several models used in existing theoretical and empirical work. Within
this framework, I define parameters of interest, provide identification conditions for these
parameters and evaluate the performance of commonly applied methods such as the difference
in means, linear-in-means models and partial population designs. Finally, I study estimation
and inference with a special focus on the effect of the number of parameters on the asymptotic
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properties of the estimators, and discuss the implications of my results for experimental
design.
The findings in this paper offer several takeaways for analyzing spillover effects in empirical
work. A first conclusion that stems from Section 3 is that that the difference-in-means
estimator can give a poor measure of the effects of a treatment when spillovers are present.
On the other hand, the full vector of spillover effects is easily identifiable whenever the design
generates enough variation in the number of treated units in each group, and can be easily
estimated using simple linear regressions.
Second, while nonparametric estimation of all direct and spillover effects can give a com-
plete picture of the effects of the treatment, it can be difficult to implement in practice when
groups are large. As a guideline to determine in which cases spillover effects can be esti-
mated nonparametrically, Theorem 2 formalizes the notion of a “large enough sample” in
this context, and provides a way to assess the performance of the different types of treatment
effect estimators depending on the number of groups, number of parameters of interest and
treatment assignment mechanism.
Third, when fully-nonparametric estimation of spillover effects is not feasible, this paper
compares different ways to aggregate information to facilitate the practical implementation.
In particular, I show that the commonly employed linear-in-means estimator can give an
inaccurate measure of spillover effects, except under strong parametric assumptions. On the
other hand, the pooling estimands in Section 3.1 provide weighted averages of spillover effects
with known (or estimable) weights, and inference on these parameters can be conducted
under mild conditions, as shown in Theorem 2. These findings also highlight the importance
of clearly defining the set of parameters of interest, and how these choices determine at least
partly the performance of alternative estimators and the way in which experiments should
be designed.
The analysis in this paper leaves several questions open for future research. In terms
of the setup, while the partial interference assumption has wide empirical applicability, in
many contexts spillovers can occur through more complex interaction structures. The cur-
rently developing literature on networks seems like a natural path to generalize my setup.
Future work should also formally address issues that arise frequently in empirical studies
measuring spillovers, such as imperfectly measured groups or treatment missclasification.
Another important issue is imperfect compliance, which is a pervasive problem in random-
ized evaluations. In ongoing work (Vazquez-Bare, 2019), I propose a setup with spillover
effects under imperfect compliance, defining parameters of interest, providing conditions for
nonparametric identification and analyzing estimation and inference.
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Appendices
A Review of the literature
For a direct comparison between the literature and my setup, I will focus on the case in which
the covariate of interest is a binary treatment Dig. I will follow the notation introduced in
the paper.
A.1 Econometric models, LIM, response functions
The linear-in-means (LIM) model is arguably the most widely used tool to analyze peer
effects in most areas of economics. In its standard version, a LIM model is given by the
equation:
Yig = α+ βDig + γD¯
(i)
g + δY¯
(i)
g + εig (13)
where D¯
(i)
g is the leave-one-out sample average of D (in this case, the proportion of ones)
excluding Dig, and similarly for Y¯
(i)
g . In this equation, β is the direct effect of the treatment, γ
is the exogenous effect and δ is the endogenous effect. A “large group” version of this equation
replaces D¯
(i)
g and Y¯
(i)
g with their within-group population averages Eg[D] and Eg[Y ] (see e.g.
Manski, 1993). A LIM model is often interpreted as the Nash equilibrium of a game in which
players maximize a quadratic utility function (Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Jayaraman, 2015;
Kline and Tamer, 2019):
max
Yig
U
(
Yig, Y¯
(i)
g
)
= ξigYig −
(1− δ)Y 2ig
2
− δ
2
(Yig − Y¯ (i)g )2
In this equation, the first two terms represent a private component of utility, with marginal
private benefit equal to ξig and a convex cost, and the last term captures a “social pressure”
component (Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Jayaraman, 2015). The presence of this last term
implies that an individual gets higher utility by choosing an action Yig that is close the the
average action in her group. The first-order condition of this maximization problem yields
Equation 13 after setting ξig = α+ βDig + γD¯
(i)
g + εig.
Manski (1993) pointed out two identification problems associated with model 13. First,
the model includes endogenous variables, namely, the outcomes of other units, as regressors
(the reflection problem). Second, the presence of a group-level fixed effect can generate a
correlation between the error term and the regressors (the problem of correlated effects). Sev-
eral approaches have been put forward to ensure identification of γ and δ, such as exploiting
the variation generated by partially-overlapping groups (Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin,
2009; De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli, 2010), using variation in group sizes (Lee, 2007;
Davezies, D’Haultfoeuille, and Fouge`re, 2009) or combining the availability of an exogenous
instrument with the panel-like structure of the data (Graham and Hahn, 2005). However,
these methods only work in specific contexts and can be very demanding in terms of data
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requirements. A more straightforward approach taken by the literature is to give up separate
identification of γ and δ, and use the fact that under appropriate restrictions on the model
parameters, Equation 13 can be solved to obtain a reduced-form equation (corresponding to
a Nash equilibrium):
Yig = λ+ µDig + θD¯
(i)
g + uig (14)
where the coefficients (λ, µ, θ) are (nonlinear) functions of the structural parameters (α, β, γ, δ).
In this case, θ captures the composite exogenous and endogenous peer effect. Although Equa-
tion 14 does not allow separate identification of the exogenous and endogenous effects, Manski
(2013a,b) has argued that the reduced form may actually be the object of interest from a pol-
icy perspective, since a policy intervention can affect exogenous variables but not outcomes
directly.
While Equation 14 circumvents the endogeneity generated by the presence of Y¯
(i)
g , its
parameters remain unidentified when (Dig, D¯
(i)
g ) are correlated with uig. Such correlation
can arise, for example, when units in the same group are subject to common shocks. If
these common shocks are correlated with the regressors, the reduced-form parameters are
not identified. For instance, suppose Dig indicates whether student i in classroom g has ever
failed a grade, and D¯
(i)
g is the proportion of students excluding i that have failed a grade
(repeaters). If classrooms with a higher proportion of repeaters are assigned better teachers,
then teacher quality is a group-level shock that is correlated with the regressors, and it is
impossible to disentangle the effect of having more repeaters from the effect of having better
teachers.
Again, the literature has offered several alternatives to deal with this issue. A credible
approach has been to rely on random assignment to eliminate the correlation between the
regressors and the error term. There are two main ways in which randomization is conducted
in the peer effects literature. The first one is random assignment of group membership. For
instance, Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (2003) and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006)
exploit random (or random-like) assignment of college roommates, while Lyle (2007) and
Carrell, Fullerton, and West (2009) study the case of random assignment into peer groups in
West Point and the Air Force Academy, respectively. Graham (2008) takes advantage of the
random assignment of students to small and large classrooms in Project STAR to identify
peer effects through variance contrasts. However, random assignment of groups breaks apart
when individuals refuse to interact with the peers they were assigned to (Carrell, Sacerdote,
and West, 2013). The second method is direct random assignment of the treatment. Moffit
(2001) argued in favor of partial-population experiments, in which the proportion of treated
units is randomized in each group. Some examples exploiting random assignment of treatment
in linear-in-means models are Lalive and Cattaneo (2009), Bobonis and Finan (2009) and
Dieye, Djebbari, and Barrera-Osorio (2014).
Even when randomization is possible, identification of the parameters still relies strongly
on the linearity imposed on Equations 13 and 14, and the question remains of whether (i) the
linear model is an appropriate representation of the phenomenon under study and (ii) it is
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possible to achieve identification without imposing a linear structure. Attempts to relax the
linearity assumption have been motivated by both theoretical and empirical considerations.
On the one hand, the linear model is generally incorrect when outcomes are binary or discrete.
This observation sparked a large literature on binary-choice models with social interactions
(see e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001). Although this literature removes linearity, it usually does
so by replacing it by alternative (and possibly equally strong) parametric or distributional
assumptions. On the other hand, the linear model has been criticized on empirical grounds
for the unrealistic restrictions that it imposes on the structure of peer effects (Hoxby and
Weingarth, 2005; Carrell, Fullerton, and West, 2009; Sacerdote, 2011, 2014).
On the opposite end of the spectrum, Manski (2013b) and Lazzati (2015) study nonpara-
metric partial identification of the response function, that is, the reduced-form relationship
between outcomes and treatment assignments, in presence of social interactions. These pa-
pers characterize identification regions for the distribution of the potential outcomes under
different restrictions on the structural model, the response functions and the structure of
social interactions.
In this paper, I focus on identification and estimation of (reduced-form) response func-
tions under random assignment of the treatment. By considering the “many small groups”
case with an exogenous treatment, I can achieve point identification in a setting that has
wide empirical applicability. On the other hand, randomization allows me to bypass the
endogeneity issues that plague observational studies and focus on the structure of the re-
sponse function, with emphasis on the restrictions that justify the different models that the
literature has used in practice and their causal interpretation. Specifically, after defining a
potential outcome Yig(d,dg), I show how a general, nonparametric potential-outcome model
can become a (reduced-form) LIM model under three conditions, namely (i) exchangeability,
(ii) equal spillover effects under treatment and control status, and (iii) linear spillover effects.
I also analyze the parameters that can be recovered by a misspecified LIM model.
A.2 Analysis of experiments with interference
By “analysis of experiments with interference” I refer to a body of research, developed pri-
marily in statistics and epidemiology, that studies causal inference in experiments when the
potential outcome of a unit can depend on the treatment assignments of other units (i.e.,
a failure of the SUTVA). Rubin (1990) and later Halloran and Struchiner (1991, 1995) ex-
tended the potential-outcomes causal framework by letting each unit’s potential outcome to
depend on the vector of treatment assignments in a sample. In this setting, the literature
has mostly focused on four estimands. Given a sample with units i = 1, . . . ,M , the direct
effect is the difference in potential outcomes for unit i under treatment and control, given
a vector of assignments for the remaining M − 1 units. The indirect effect is the difference
in the outcomes of unit i, given own treatment assignment, for two possible assignments of
the remaining M − 1 units. The total effect is the sum of the direct and indirect effects.
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Finally, the overall effect is the difference between the potential outcomes of unit i under two
alternative vector of treatment assignments. The corresponding average effects are defined
by simply averaging these estimands over the whole sample, as described below. As it is com-
mon in analysis of experiments (see e.g. Imbens and Rubin, 2015), potential outcomes are
seen as fixed, and all the randomness comes through the treatment assignment mechanism.
The main complication that arises in a setting with interference is that the number of
potential outcomes for each unit can become very large, taking up to 2M values. Sobel
(2006) introduced the assumption of partial interference, under which units in a sample are
partitioned into groups, and interference can only occur between units in the same group.
This assumption greatly simplifies the problem and seems to have been adopted by a vast
majority of studies in this literature. Following the notation I defined in the paper, I will
consider a sample of g = 1, . . . , G groups, each with i = 1 . . . , ng + 1 units.
Given the focus on finite populations with non-random outcomes, identification issues
are largely absent from this literature, and interest is placed instead on finding unbiased
estimators for the estimands of interest, estimating their variance and performing inference.
Hudgens and Halloran (2008) discuss unbiased estimation and variance calculations under
partial interference under two-stage randomization designs. They focus on finite-population
versions of the estimands described above, in which individual potential outcomes are aver-
aged over the distribution of the vector of neighbors’ assignments. More precisely, given a
probability distribution of treatment assignment parameterized by ψ, the individual average
potential outcome under assignment d is defined as:
Y¯ig(d, ψ) =
∑
dg∈Dg
Yig(d,dg)Pψ[D(i)g = dg|Dig = d]
Based on this magnitude, the group average potential outcome and the (finite) population
average potential outcome are given by:
Y¯g(d, ψ) =
1
ng + 1
ng+1∑
i=1
Y¯ig(d, ψ), Y¯ (d, ψ) =
1
G
G∑
g=1
 1
ng + 1
ng+1∑
i=1
Y¯ig(d, ψ)

Then, the population average direct effect is given by Y¯ (1, ψ)−Y¯ (0, ψ); given two parameter-
izations of the treatment assignment distribution, ψ and φ, the population average indirect
effect is Y¯ (0, ψ)− Y¯ (0, φ); the population average total effect is Y¯ (1, ψ)− Y¯ (0, φ) (which is
the sum of the direct and indirect effects). Hudgens and Halloran (2008) propose unbiased
estimators for the above estimands, and provide variance estimators under exchangeability.
Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele (2012) and Rigdon and Hudgens (2015) propose finite
sample confidence intervals, while Liu and Hudgens (2014) study confidence intervals in a
large-sample randomization inference context. Basse and Feller (2018) adapt the variance
estimators to the case of varying group sizes and link the randomization inference framework
with the regression framework.
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The statistics literature focuses almost exclusively on inference for finite populations
with fixed potential outcomes, in which all the randomness comes through the assignment
mechanism. The super-population approach, under which potential outcomes are drawn from
a certain (infinite) population distribution, has two advantages over the finite population
one. First, the parameters are defined with respect to a population of interest instead of
a particular realization of a sample. In this sense, a super-population parameter has more
external validity and more policy relevance than a magnitude which is only defined for a
particular sample. Incidentally, some common population estimands of interest are not well
defined when potential outcomes are fixed; for instance, the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT) is a random variable in a finite sample. Second, the population approach
allows me to clearly distinguish the assumptions needed for identification from the ones
needed for estimation and inference. This distinction gives a clearer conceptual picture of
what conditions are required to identify the parameters of interest and what conditions are
simplifications that permit estimating them and conducting hypothesis testing.
Among the few studies that analyze interference under a super-population approach,
Philipson (2000) suggests conducting two-stage randomization experiments to analyze how
average outcomes change in response to different shares of treated units in the population
(“external effects”), while Baird, Bohren, McIntosh, and O¨zler (2018) perform power calcu-
lations for the above estimands (in its super-population version) under what they call sat-
uration designs. Both studies consider a setting in which units are partitioned intro groups
and potential outcomes are exchangeable.
Under both the finite-population and the super-population approaches, two-stage ran-
domization has played a crucial role in the interference literature. In fact, some estimands of
interest like the average indirect effect Y¯ (0, ψ)− Y¯ (0, φ) in Hudgens and Halloran (2008) are
generally undefined under other designs like, for instance, simple randomization. Further-
more, the few studies discussing identification of population parameters tend to attribute
identifying power to the 2SR design. For example, the abstract from Philipson (2000) states
that “two-stage randomization schemes, which randomize allocation of treatments across
communities and randomizes the treatments themselves within communities, are useful for
identifying private and external treatment effects.”, while Baird, Bohren, McIntosh, and
O¨zler (2018) claim: “[w]e show that [randomized saturation] designs identify a set of novel
estimands” (page 2). However, I show in my paper that (i) spillover effects can be defined
without reference to a specific assignment mechanism or experimental design, and (ii) these
spillover effects can be identified as long as the assignment mechanism puts non-zero proba-
bility on each possible assignment. Specifically, I argue that a simple randomized (Bernoulli)
experiment is enough to identify all the parameters of interest.
While most of this literature assumes partial interference, a recent body of research seeks
to adapt the potential outcomes framework to more general structures of social interactions
through arbitrary networks. When allowing for general interference, potential outcomes can
depend on the treatment assignment of the whole population. In fact, the partial interference
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assumption can be seen precisely as a way to simplify this problem; in a networks setting,
partial interference corresponds to the case with many independent networks (or alternatively,
a large network with a block diagonal adjacency matrix). Since estimation and inference
can become infeasible when the structure of interactions is completely arbitrary, the main
challenge faced by this literature is therefore to provide reasonable restrictions on the type
of interference that can occur between units.
Some studies replace the partial interference by similar but more general restrictions on
the spillovers structure. For instance, Leung (2017) proposes restrictions on the structure
of dependency graphs, which describe the correlation structure in a network, to perform
asymptotic inference in a super-population framework. On the other hand, Eckles, Karrer,
and Ugander (2017) study the bias of the global ATE estimator under different modeling
assumptions and experimental designs. Choi (2017) considers identification under the as-
sumption that the treatment effect is monotone.
B Alternatives to the exchangeability assumption
B.1 Lack of exchangeability
Although the exchangeability assumption can make potential outcomes more tractable by
reducing the dimensionality, it is not necessary for identification and inference. In this section
I show how to extend the results in the paper to the general case without exchangeability. The
potential outcome is given by Yig(d,dg) where d = 0, 1 and dg ∈ D ⊆ {0, 1}ng , with observed
outcome Yig =
∑
d
∑
dg
Yig(d,dg)1(Dig = d,D(i)g = dg). The parameters of interest are the
average potential outcomes E[Yig(d,dg)] for all d and dg ∈ Dg, which allow us to construct
all possible treatment effects,
E[Yig(d,dg)]− E[Yig(d˜, d˜g)]
for any possible pair of treatment assignments (d,dg) and (d˜, d˜g). To ease notation, I will
drop the g subscript in dg unless required for clarity. In particular,
τd = E[Yig(1,d)]− E[Yig(0,d)]
θd(d) = E[Yig(d,d)]− E[Yig(d,0)]
which are analogous to the direct and average spillover effects defined in the paper.
Under the assumption of independence between potential outcomes and treatment as-
signments (Assupmtion 2 in the main paper), we have the following result.
Lemma 8 (Identification without exchangeability) Under Assumption 2, for any as-
signment (d,dg) such that P[Dig = d,D(i)g = d] > 0,
E[Yig|Dig = d,D(i)g = d] = E[Yig(d,d)].
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Table 6: Estimation results
coef s.e.
Dig 0.165** 0.066
(1−Dig)Di1g(1−Di2g) 0.133** 0.067
(1−Dig)(1−Di1g)Di2g) 0.163** 0.07
(1−Dig)Di1gDi2g 0.14** 0.056
DigDi1g(1−Di2g) -0.039 0.027
Dig(1−Di1g)Di2g -0.044* 0.026
DigDi1gDi2g -0.051** 0.025
Constant 0.706*** 0.057
Observations 504
Chi-squared test 0.444
p-value 0.642
Notes: Cluster-robust s.e. Regressions include school FE. ***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05,*p < 0.1.
This result is analogous to Lemma 2 in the paper, with the difference that the left-hand side
conditions on the whole vector of neighbors’ assignments, instead of just the total number of
treated neighbors. The proof is immediate and hence omitted.
Lemma 8 provides a simple way to test for exchangeability. Exchangeability requires that
E[Yig(d,d)] = E[Yig(d, d˜)] for any d, d˜ such that 1′gdg = 1′gd˜g. Since all these magnitude are
identified and estimable, testing for ecxhangeability simply consists on assessing whether the
average potential outcomes for assignments with the same number of treated peers are equal.
Table 6 shows the estimates for direct and spillover effects with the data used in the
paper, but without imposing exchangeability. I define the order between siblings by looking at
differences (in absolute value) in ages, defining sibling 1 as the sibling closest in age and sibling
2 as the sibling farthest in age. Then, estimation is conducted by simply adding indicator
variables for the possible different assignments. Using these estimates, exchangeability is
easily tested by assessing whether the spillover effects of siblings 1 and 2 are the same, which
in this case amounts to testing equality of coefficients between rows 2 and 3, and between
rows 5 and 6. The results are given in the last two rows of the table, which is clearly not
able to reject exchangeability in this case.
B.2 Reference groups
Exchangeability fails when each unit in a group is only affected by a strict subset of neighbors,
since in this case some of the spillover effects are automatically zero, while others may not.
If unit i’s outcome can be affected by unit j’s assignment but not by unit k’s, then it is
clear that units j and k cannot be exchangeable for unit i, since switching treatment from
unit j to k will change unit i’s outcome. However, when one has some information on the
network structure, this situation is easy to handle in the above framework by manually setting
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some coefficients to zero and assuming exchangeability within each unit’s reference group.
More precisely, for each unit i, let Ri be unit i’s reference group, that is, the set of indices
corresponding to units that are linked to (that is, can potentially affect) unit i (for example,
the set of unit i’s friends). Then, the number of treated neighbors can be redefined as:
SRig =
∑
j∈Ri
Djg
and all the previous results hold replacing Sig by S
R
ig. This condition gives a middle ground
between the case where each neighbor has a specific identity and the case where all the
members in the group are exchangeable.
C Endogenous effects and structural models
As described in the literature review, a large literature in economics has studied identification
in structural models in which the outcome of a unit depends on the outcomes of neighbors.
While Manski (2013a), Manski (2013b) and Angrist (2014) have questioned the relevance
of such models from a causal perspective, it is interesting to ask what type of structural
model can justify the response functions that I study in this paper. To simplify the discus-
sion, consider a setting with groups of size 2, that is, each unit has one neighbor. Suppose
the potential outcomes yi are generated by the following system, where the arguments are
suppressed to simplify notation:
y1 = f(d1, d2, y2, ε1)
y2 = f(d2, d1, y1, ε2)
This implies that
y1 = f(d1, d2, f(d2, d1, y1, ε2), ε1)
y2 = f(d2, d1, f(d1, d2, y2, ε1), ε2)
Depending on the form of the f(·, ·, ·), the above system may have one, zero or multiple
equilibria. Suppose that f(·, ·, ·) is such that the system has a unique equilibrium. Then, the
reduced form is given by:
yi = ϕ(di, dj , εi, εj)
Now, define φ(di, dj , εi) = E[ϕ(di, dj , εi, εj)|εi], which integrates over εj .Then,
yi = ϕ(di, dj , εi) + uij
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where uij = ϕ(di, dj , εi, εj)− ϕ(di, dj , εi). Now, because di and dj are binary, we have that:
ϕ(di, dj , εi) = ϕ
00
i (1− di)(1− dj) + ϕ10i di(1− dj)
+ ϕ01i (1− di)dj + ϕ11i didj
: = ϕ00i + (ϕ
10
i − ϕ00i )di + (ϕ01i − ϕ00i )dj
+ (ϕ11i − ϕ01i − ϕ10i + ϕ00i )didj
and therefore
yi = ϕ
00
i + (ϕ
10
i − ϕ00i )di + (ϕ01i − ϕ00i )dj + (ϕ11i − ϕ01i − ϕ10i + ϕ00i )didj + uij
The above expression can be relabeled to match the notation in the paper, ignoring the group
subscript:
Yi(d, d
1) = Yij(0) + τid+ γi(0)d
1 + (γi(1)− γi(0))d · d1
where Yij,g(0) = φ
00
ig + uij,g.
An important difference when allowing for endogenous effects is the presence of an addi-
tional term, uij , which depends on the heterogeneity of all units in the group. The presence of
this term will generally introduce correlation between units in the same group. This feature
does not affect identification, but has to be taken into account when performing inference.
Importantly,since the treatment indicators are binary, the reduced form can always be
written in a fully saturated form, which does not require any assumptions on the structural
equations, besides the restrictions that guarantee a unique equilibrium.
As an illustration, consider the following structural function:
yi = f(di, yj , εi) = αi + βidi + θiyj + δidiyj
where αi = α(εi) and similarly for βi, θi and δi. Then,
yi = αi + θi(αj + θjyi) if di = 0, dj = 0
yi = αi + βi + (θi + δi)(αj + θjyi) if di = 1, dj = 0
yi = αi + θi(αj + βj + (θj + δj)yi) if di = 0, dj = 1
yi = αi + βi + (θi + δi)(αj + βj + (θj + δj)yi) if di = 1, dj = 1
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which implies the reduced form:
yi =
αi+θiαj
1−θiθj if di = 0, dj = 0
yi =
αi+θiαj
1−(θi+δi)θj +
βi
1−(θi+δi)θj if di = 1, dj = 0
yi =
αi+θiαj
1−θi(θj+δj) +
βjθi
1−θi(θj+δj) if di = 0, dj = 1
yi =
αi+θiαj
1−(θi+δi)(θj+δj) +
βi
1−(θi+δi)(θj+δj) +
βjθi
1−(θi+δi(θj+δj) if di = 1, dj = 1
as long as θiθj , (θi + δi)θj , θi(θj + δj) and (θ+ δi)(θj + δj) are different from 1 almost surely.
This expression can be rewritten as before:
yi = ϕ
00
i + (ϕ
10
i − ϕ00i )di + (ϕ01i − ϕ00i )dj + (ϕ11i − ϕ01i − ϕ10i + ϕ00i )didj + uij
where now all the ϕi terms are functions of the structural parameters. Notice that the
neighbor’s treatment assignment enters the reduced form in levels and with an interaction,
even though it does not enter the structural equation. This is so because in the reduced form
equation, dj captures the effect of yj .
D Unequally-sized groups
To explicitly account for different group sizes, let n (the total number of peers in each group)
take values in N = {n1, n2, . . . , nK} where nk ≥ 1 for all k and n1 < n2 < . . . < nK . Let
the potential outcome be Yig(n, d, s(n)) where n ∈ N and s(n) ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}. Let Ng
be the observed value of ng, Sig(n) =
∑n
j 6=iDjg and Sig =
∑K
k=1 Sig(nk)1(Ng = nk). The
independence assumption can be modified to hold conditional on group size:
Yig(n, d, s(n)) ⊥ Dg(n))|Ng = n
where Dg(n)) is the vector of all treatment assignments when the group size is n+ 1.
Under this assumption, we have that for n ∈ N and s ≤ n,
E[Yig|Dig = d, Sig = s,Ng = n] = E[Yig(n, d, s)].
The average observed outcome conditional on Ng = n can be written as:
E[Yig|Dig, Sig, Ng = n] = E[Yig(n, 0, 0)] + τ0(n)Dig
+
n∑
s=1
θs(0, n)1(Sig = s)(1−Dig)
+
n∑
s=1
θs(1, n)1(Sig = s)Dig
The easiest approach is to simply run separate analyses for each group size and estimate
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all the effects separately. In this case, it is possible to test whether spillover effects are
different in groups with different sizes. The total number of parameters in this case is given
by
∑K
k=1(nk + 1).
In practice, however, there may be cases in which group size has a rich support with
only a few groups at each value ng, so separate analyses may not be feasible. In such a
setting, a possible solution is to impose an additivity assumption on group size. According
to this assumption, the average direct and spillover effects do not change with group size.
For example, the spillover effect of having one treated neighbor is the same in a group with
two or three units. Under this assumption,
E[Yig|Dig, Sig, Ng] =
∑
ng∈Ng
α(ng)1(Ng = ng) + τ0Dig
+
Ng∑
s=1
θs(0)1(Sig = s)(1−Dig)
+
Ng∑
s=1
θs(1)1(Sig = s)Dig
where the first sum can be seen in practice as adding group-size fixed effects. Then, the
identification results and estimation strategies in the paper are valid after controlling for
group-size fixed effects. Note that in this case the total number of parameters to estimate is
nK +K − 1 where nK is the size of the largest group and K is the total number of different
group sizes.
Another possibility is to assume that for any constant c ∈ N, Yig(c·n, d, c·s) = Yig(n, d, s).
This assumption allows us to rewrite the potential outcomes as a function of the ratio of
treated peers, Yig(d, s/n). Letting Pig = Sig/Ng, all the parameters can be estimated by
running a regression including Dig, 1(Pig = p) for all possible values of p > 0 (excluding p = 0
to avoid perfect collinearity) and interactions. In this case, the total number of parameters
can be bounded by n1 +
∑K
k=2(nk − 1). Note that assuming that the potential outcomes
depend only on the proportion of treated siblings does not justify in any way including the
variable Pig linearly, as commonly done in linear-in-means models.
E Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Fix d ∈ {0, 1}. Let ξd(·) : Dg → R be a function such that ξd(dg) =
E[Yig(d,dg)] for any dg ∈ Dg. For s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ng}, let Bs = {dg ∈ Dg : 1′gdg = s}, and
note that ∪ngs=0Bs = Dg and Bs ∩ Bs˜ = ∅ for s 6= s˜. By Assumption 1, the image set of
each Bs, ξd(Bs), is a singleton. Call the only element of this image set µd(s), and collect all
these elements in Fg = {µd(s)}ngs=0, and note that ξd(Dg) = Fg. Next, let Sg = {0, 1, . . . , ng}
and define a function µ(d, ·) : Sg → R by setting µ(d, s) = µd(s) for each s ∈ Sg. Then,
µ(d,Sg) = Fg and for any dg ∈ Dg such that 1′gdg = s, we have that µ(d, s) = E[Yig(d,dg)].
45
Proof of Lemma 2 First, for all assignments with non-zero probability,
E[Yig|Dig = d, Sig] = E
{
E[Yig|Dig = d,D(i)g, Sig]
∣∣Dig = d, Sig}
= E
∑
dg
E[Yig(d,dg)|Dig = d,D(i)g = dg, Sig]1(D(i)g = dg)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Dig = d, Sig

= E
∑
dg
E[Yig(d,dg)]1(D(i)g = dg)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Dig = d, Sig

=
∑
dg
E[Yig(d,dg)]P[D(i)g = dg|Dig = d, Sig]
Then, since P[D(i)g = dg|Dig = d, Sig = sg] = 0 if 1′gdg 6= s,
E[Yig|Dig = d, Sig = s] =
∑
dg :1′gdg=s
E[Yig(d,dg)]P[D(i)g = dg|Dig = d, Sig = s]
= µ(d, s)
∑
dg :1′gdg=s
P[D(i)g = dg|Dig = d, Sig = s]
= µ(d, s).
The second equality follows from the definition of θs(d). 
Proof of Lemma 3 This result follows straightforwardly by noting that
E[Yig|Dig = d, Sig = s] =
∑
dg∈Dg
E[Yig|Dig = d, Sig = s,D(i)g = dg]P[D(i)g = dg|Dig = d, Sig = s]
=
∑
1′gdg=s
E[Yig(d,dg)]
P[Dig = d|D(i)g = dg]P[D(i)g = dg]
P[Dig = d|Sig = s]P[Sig = s] .
using independence and Bayes’ rule. 
Proof of Lemma 4 Follows from the fact that E[Yig|Tg = 0] = µ(0, 0) and
E[Yig|Dig = 0, Tg = 1] =
∑
s
E[Yig|Dig = 0, Tg = 1, Sig = s]P[Sig = s|Dig = 0, Tg = 1]
=
∑
s
µ(0, s)P[Sig = s|Dig = 0, Tg = 1]
which gives the desired result. 
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Proof of Lemma 5 Use the fact that
E[Yig|Dig = d] =
∑
s
E[Yig|Dig = d, Sig = s]P[Sig = s|Dig = d]
=
∑
s
µ(d, s)P[Sig = s|Dig = d]
= τ0 +
∑
s
θs(d)P[Sig = s|Dig = d]
where the second equality uses the independence assumption. 
Proof of Lemma 6 By independence between Dig and Sig under simple random assign-
ment,
γ` =
Cov(Yig, D¯
(i)
g )
V[D¯(i)g ]
= ng
Cov(Yig, Sig)
V[Sig]
= ng
Cov(E[Yig|Sig], Sig)
V[Sig]
but E[Yig|Sig] = pE[Yig|Dig = 1, Sig] + (1− p)E[Yig|Dig = 0, Sig], and
E[Yig|Dig = d, Sig] = µ(0, 0) + τ0d+
∑
s
θs(d)1(Sig = s)
and calculating the covariance gives the result. 
Proof of Lemma 7 Follows by the same argument as the previous lemma but condition-
ing on Dig = d. 
Lemma 9 Let pˆi(a) :=
∑
g
∑
i 1ig(a)/G(n+ 1). Then under the assumptions of Theorem 1,
max
a∈An
∣∣∣∣ pˆi(a)pi(a) − 1
∣∣∣∣→P 0
Proof of Lemma 9 Take ε > 0, then
P
[
max
a∈An
∣∣∣∣ pˆi(a)pi(a) − 1
∣∣∣∣ > ε] ≤ ∑
a∈An
P
[∣∣∣∣ pˆi(a)pi(a) − 1
∣∣∣∣ > ε] ≤ |An| maxa∈An P [|pˆi(a)− pi(a)| > εpi(a)]
≤ 2|An| max
a∈An
exp
{
−2G
2ε2pi(a)2
G
}
= 2|An| exp
{−2ε2Gpi2n}
= 2 exp
{
−Gpi2n
(
2ε2 − log |An|
Gpi2n
)}
→ 0
where the second line uses Hoeffding’s inequality. 
Proof of Theorem 1 Take a constant c ∈ R. Then
P
[
min
a∈An
N(a) ≤ c
]
≤ |An| max
a∈An
P[N(a) ≤ c].
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Now, for any δ > 0,
P[N(a) ≤ c] = P
[
N(a) ≤ c,
∣∣∣∣ pˆi(a)pi(a) − 1
∣∣∣∣ > δ]+ P [N(a) ≤ c, ∣∣∣∣ pˆi(a)pi(a) − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ]
≤ P
[∣∣∣∣ pˆi(a)pi(a) − 1
∣∣∣∣ > δ]+ P[N(a) ≤ c,G(n+ 1)pi(a)(1− δ) ≤ N(a) ≤ pi(a)G(n+ 1)(1 + δ)]
≤ P
[∣∣∣∣ pˆi(a)pi(a) − 1
∣∣∣∣ > δ]+ 1(G(n+ 1)pi(a) ≤ c/(1− δ))
≤ P
[∣∣∣∣ pˆi(a)pi(a) − 1
∣∣∣∣ > δ]+ 1(G(n+ 1)pin ≤ c/(1− δ))
which implies
|An| max
a∈An
P[N(a) ≤ c] ≤ |An| max
a∈An
P
[∣∣∣∣ pˆi(a)pi(a) − 1
∣∣∣∣ > δ]+ |An|1(G(n+ 1)pin ≤ c/(1− δ))
which converges to zero under condition 8 and using Lemma 9. 
Lemma 10 Under the assumptions of Theorem 1,
max
a∈An
{∣∣∣∣pi(a)pˆi(a) − 1
∣∣∣∣ · 1(N(a) > 0)}→P 0
Proof of Lemma 10 follows from Lemma 9 and Theorem 1 using that P[mina∈An N(a) =
0]→ 0. 
Proof of Theorem 2 All the estimators below are only defined when 1(N(a) > 0).
Because under the conditions for Theorem 1 this event occurs with probability approaching
one, the indicator will be omitted to simplify the notation. Let εig(a) = Yig−E[Yig|Aig = a].
For the consistency part, we have that∑
g
∑
i εig(a)1ig(a)
N(a)
=
∑
g
∑
i(εig(a)1(|εig| > ξn)− E[εig(a)1(|εig| > ξn)])1ig(a)
N(a)
+
∑
g
∑
i(εig(a)1(|εig| ≤ ξn)− E[εig(a)1(|εig| ≤ ξn)])1ig(a)
N(a)
for some increasing sequence of constants ξn whose rate will be determined along the proof.
Let
εig(a) = εig(a)1(|εig(a)| ≤ ξn)− E[εig(a)1(|εig(a)| ≤ ξn)]
and
ε¯ig(a) = εig(a)1(|εig(a)| > ξn)− E[εig(a)1(|εig(a)| > ξn)]
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For the first term,
P
[
max
a∈An
∣∣∣∣
∑
g
∑
i εig(a)1ig(a)
N(a)
∣∣∣∣ > Mrn∣∣∣∣A] ≤
|An| max
a∈An
P
[∣∣∣∣
∑
g
∑
i εig(a)1ig(a)
N(a)
∣∣∣∣ > Mrn∣∣∣∣A]
For the right-hand side, by Bernstein’s inequality
P
[∣∣∣∣∣∑
g
∑
i
εig(a)1ig(a)
∣∣∣∣∣ > N(a)Mrn
∣∣∣∣∣A
]
≤ 2 exp
{
−1
2
M2r2nN(a)
2
σ2(a)N(a) + 2ξnMrnN(a)/3
}
= 2 exp
{
−1
2
M2r2nN(a)
σ2(a) + 2Mξnrn/3
}
≤ 2 exp
{
−1
2
M2r2n mina∈An N(a)
σ¯2 + 2Mξnrn/3
}
Set
rn =
√
log |An|
G(n+ 1)pin
Next, use the fact that
mina∈An N(a)
G(n+ 1)pin
→P 1
which follows from Lemma 9, since
P[pi(a)(1− ε) ≤ pˆi(a) ≤ pi(a)(1 + ε), ∀a]→ 1
for any ε > 0 and
P[pi(a)(1− ε) ≤ pˆi(a) ≤ pi(a)(1 + ε), ∀a] ≤ P[pin(1− ε) ≤ mina pˆi(a) ≤ pin(1 + ε)]
= P
[∣∣∣∣mina pˆi(a)pin − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε] .
Then,
P
[∣∣∣∣∣∑
g
∑
i
εig(a)1ig(a)
∣∣∣∣∣ > N(a)Mrn
∣∣∣∣∣A
]
≤ 2 exp
{
−1
2
M2 log |An|(1 + oP(1))
σ¯2 + 2Mξnrn/3
}
and therefore
P
[
max
a∈An
∣∣∣∣
∑
g
∑
i εig(a)1ig(a)
N(a)
∣∣∣∣ > Mrn∣∣∣∣A] ≤
2 exp
{
log |An|
(
1− 1
2
M2(1 + oP(1))
σ¯2 + 2Mrnξn/3
)}
which can be made arbitrarily small for sufficiently large M as long as rnξn = O(1).
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For the second term, by Markov’s inequality
P
[∣∣∣∣∣∑
g
∑
i
ε¯ig(a)1ig(a)
∣∣∣∣∣ > N(a)Mrn
∣∣∣∣∣A
]
≤ E[ε
2
ig(a)1(|εig(a)| > ξn)]N(a)
M2r2nN(a)
2
≤ σ¯
2
M2ξδn
1
r2n mina∈An N(a)
=
σ¯2
M2
1
ξδn log |An|(1 + oP(1))
so that
P
[
max
a∈An
∣∣∣∣∣∑
g
∑
i
ε¯ig(a)1ig(a)
∣∣∣∣∣ > N(a)Mrn
∣∣∣∣∣A
]
≤ σ¯
2
M2
|An|
ξδn log |An|(1 + oP(1))
Finally, set ξn = r
−1
n . Then, the above term can be made arbitrarily small for M sufficiently
large, as long as
|An|
log |An|
(
log |An|
G(n+ 1)pin
)δ/2
= O(1)
Setting δ = 2, this condition reduces to:
|An|
G(n+ 1)pin
= O(1)
Therefore,
max
a∈An
|µˆ(a)− µ(a)| = OP
(√
log |An|
G(n+ 1)pin
)
The proof for the standard error estimator uses the same reasoning after replacing εig(a) by
εˆ2ig(a) and using consistency of µˆ(a).
For the second part, we want to bound
∆ = max
a∈An
sup
x∈R
∣∣∣∣∣P
[
µˆ(a)− µ(a)√
V[µˆ(a)|A] ≤ x
]
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
∆ = max
a∈An
sup
x∈R
∣∣∣∣∣P
[
µˆ(a)− µ(a)√
V[µˆ(a)|A] ≤ x
]
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
= max
a∈An
sup
x∈R
∣∣∣∣∣E
{
P
[
µˆ(a)− µ(a)√
V[µˆ(a)|A] ≤ x
∣∣∣∣∣A
]
− Φ(x)
}∣∣∣∣∣
≤ E
{
max
a∈An
sup
x∈R
∣∣∣∣∣P
[
µˆ(a)− µ(a)√
V[µˆ(a)|A] ≤ x
∣∣∣∣∣A
]
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
}
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Then, ∣∣∣∣∣P
[
µˆ(a)− µ(a)√
V[µˆ(a)|A] ≤ x
∣∣∣∣∣A
]
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣P
[∑
g
∑
i εig1ig(a)
σ(a)
√
N(a)
≤ x
∣∣∣∣∣A
]
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
By the Berry-Esseen bound,
sup
x∈R
∣∣∣∣∣P
[∑
g
∑
i εig1ig(a)
σ(a)
√
N(a)
≤ x
∣∣∣∣∣A
]
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cτ¯3σ3 · 1√N(a)
But
1
N(a)
= OP
(
1
G(n+ 1)pi(a)
)
Therefore,
max
a∈An
sup
x∈R
∣∣∣∣∣P
[∑
g
∑
i εig1ig(a)
σ(a)
√
N(a)
≤ x
∣∣∣∣∣A
]
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cτ¯3σ3 ·OP
(
1√
G(n+ 1)pin
)
and the result follows. 
Proof of Theorem 3 We want to bound:
∆∗(a) = sup
x
∣∣∣∣∣P∗
[
µˆ∗(a)− µˆ(a)√
V∗[µˆ(a)]
≤ x
]
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
uniformly over a, where
µˆ∗(a) =
∑
g
∑
i Y
∗
ig1ig(a)
N(a)
if the denominator is non-zero, and zero otherwise, and where
Y ∗ig1ig(a) = (Y¯ (a) + (Yig − Y¯ (a))wig)1ig(a) = (Y¯ (a) + εˆigwig)1ig(a)
Then, if N(a) > 0,
E∗[µˆ∗(a)] = µˆ(a)
V∗[µˆ∗(a)] =
∑
g
∑
i εˆ
2
ig1ig(a)
N(a)2
The centered and scaled statistic is given by:∑
g
∑
i εˆig1ig(a)wig√∑
g
∑
i εˆ
2
ig1ig(a)
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By Berry-Esseen,
sup
x
∣∣∣∣∣∣P∗
∑g∑i εˆig1ig(a)wig√∑
g
∑
i εˆ
2
ig1ig(a)
≤ x
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ C
∑
g
∑
i |εˆig|31ig(a)/N(a)(∑
g
∑
i εˆ
2
ig1ig(a)/N(a)
)3/2 · 1√N(a)
We also have that∑
g
∑
i |εˆig|31ig(a)
N(a)
≤
∑
g
∑
i |Yig − µ(a)|31ig(a)
N(a)
+ |Y¯ (a)− µ(a)|3 +OP(N(a)−2)
= E[|Yig − µ(a)|3] +OP(N(a)−1)
and ∑
g
∑
i εˆ
2
ig1ig(a)
N(a)
=
∑
g
∑
i(Yig − µ(a))21ig(a)
N(a)
+ (Y¯ (a)− µ(a))2
= σ2(a) +OP(N(a)
−1)
Then,
∆∗(a) ≤ sup
x
∣∣∣∣∣∣P∗
∑g∑i εˆig1ig(a)wig√∑
g
∑
i εˆ
2
ig1ig(a)
≤ x
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣1(N(a) > 0) + 21(N(a) = 0)
= C
E[|Yig − µ(a)|3] +OP(N(a)−1)
[σ2(a) +OP(N(a)−1))]3/2
· 1(N(a) > 0)√
N(a)
+ 21(N(a) = 0)
and the result follows from the facts that P[minaN(a) = 0]→ 0 and by Lemma 9. 
Proof of Corollary 1 Without exchangeability, pi(a) = pi(d,dg) = pd(1−p)1−d
∏n
j=1 p
dj (1−
p)dj = pd+s(1 − p)n+1−s−d where s = 1′gdg. On the other hand, under exchangeability
pi(a) = pi(d, s) = pd(1 − p)1−d(ns)ps(1 − p)n−s = (ns)ps+d(1 − p)n+1−s−d. Observe that both
distributions are minimized at pin = p
n+1 ∝ pn where p = min{p, 1− p}. Thus,
log |An|
Gp2n
= exp
{
− logG
(
1− n+ 1
logG
2 log p− log log |An|
logG
)}
and since |An| is at most 2n+1, if (n+ 1)/ logG→ 0 the term converges to zero. 
Proof of Corollary 2 Without exchangeability, P[Dig = d,D(i)g = dg] =
(
n+1
mw
)−1
qw
where w = d + 1′gdg, which in this case reduces to
(
n+1
mw
)−1
/(n + 1). This function has a
unique minimum at (n+1)/2 when n is odd, and two minima at b(n+1)/2c and b(n+1)/2c+1
when n is even. For simplicity, assume n is odd (otherwise, take m∗ = b(n + 1)/2c to be
the minimizer of the function, and use the fact that (n + 1)/2 ≤ m∗ ≤ (n + 1)/2 + 1). The
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smallest probability is given by pin =
[(n+1)/2)!]2
(n+1)!(n+1) . Using Stirling’s formula, we have that
pi =
pi(n+ 1)((n+ 1)/2)n+1e−(n+1)√
(2pi(n+ 1))(n+ 1)n+1e−(n+1)(n+ 1)
(1 + o(1)) =
√
pi
2
· 1
2n+1
√
n+ 1
(1 + o(1))
Then,
log |An|
Gpi2n
= exp
{
− logG
(
1− n+ 1
logG
log 2− 3
2
· log(n+ 1)
logG
+ o(1)
)}
→ 0
when (n + 1)/ logG → 0. With exchangeability, P[Dig = d, Sig = s] = qd+s
(
s+1
n+1
)d
×
(
1− sn+1
)1−d
which in this case equals 1n+1
(
s+1
n+1
)d (
1− sn+1
)1−d
. This function has two
minima, one at (d, s) = (0, n) and one at (d, s) = (1, 0), giving the same minimized value of
pin = (n+ 1)
−2. Then,
log |An|
Gpi2n
= exp
{
− logG
(
1− log(n+ 1)
logG
4− log log 2(n+ 1)
logG
+ o(1)
)}
→ 0
if log(n+ 1)/ logG→ 0. 
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